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The Economic Jurisprudence of The Burger Court's
Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years.
E. Thomas Sullivan*
I. Introduction
The antitrust jurisprudence of the Burger Court defies crisp cat-
egorization. Since Chief Justice Burger was sworn in in 1969, the
Court has gradually overhauled most of the Warren Court's substan-
tive antitrust precedents. Although the Court's jurisprudential ap-
proach has shown signs of judicial restraint, especially in the narrow
range of cases chosen for review, the Burger Court's decisionmaking
demonstrates a marked break from the earlier Warren Court ap-
proach to substantive antitrust doctrines.' Analysis of the Burger
Court's contribution to antitrust development after the first thirteen
years reveals the sharp contrast with the earlier precedents and judi-
cial decisionmaking styles, and portends the direction the Court will
forge in future adjudication. This article will survey the Burger
Court's decisionmaking process in antitrust cases in light of Warren
Court antitrust precedents and established twentieth-century juris-
prudential models, and will demonstrate how the present Burger
Court approach will shape future antitrust conduct and litigation.
In place of the "competition equality" populism of earlier peri-
ods, the Burger Court has embraced a neoclassical "competition effi-
ciency" paradigm.2 In deciding each case within its own factual
context and competitive merits, the present Court is developing a
narrow, one-dimensional analytical style that emphasizes economic
• Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia.
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supporting this research, and John Kuhlman, William Fisch, and Alfred Neely for reviewing
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1 See general4y Baxter, Placing the Burger Court In Historical Perspective, 47 ANTrrRusT L.J.
803 (1978); Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ANTrrRUST L.J. 819 (1978);
Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Refections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1980).
2 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Seegeneraly A.M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13-14 (1970); Kurland, The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term - Foreword '"Equal in Orngin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Govemment," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 145 (1964).
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efficiency.3 It defines the parameters of analysis according to quanti-
tative models of prediction, to the exclusion of other relevant
considerations.
4
This article will suggest that the emerging economic jurispru-
dential paradigm isolates economic theory from political and social
policy considerations. Although the interrelationship between law
and economics helps to give antitrust law content and purpose, the
Court should not confine the legal process so narrowly. Economic
analysis should be only one of many components of the overall analy-
sis. Noneconomic concerns in a given case may be as relevant as eco-
nomic efficiency. 5 Social and historical evidence can enrich and
inform the qualitative process of decisionmaking.
6
A one-dimensional paradigm lacks the flexibility provided by an
open, practical, qualitative approach to developing competitive stan-
dards. The result may be that once the "competitive efficiency" pre-
cedent is clearly in place, only a "mechanical jurisprudence" will
remain.7 To prevent a static theory of antitrust decisionmaking, the
Court should balance the competitive interests and determine the
competitive merits in each case in the context of political and social
policy as well as economic theory. Whatever the Court's jurispruden-
tial theory of antitrust interpretation, it must remain flexible to criti-
cally reexamine changing industrial behavior within an evolving
industrial society. To approach the antitrust process from a solely
quantitative deterministic orientation is to deny the needed flex-
ibility inherent in the history of antitrust laws.8
The Burger Court has advanced its own analytical style in re-
straint issues under section one of the Sherman Act9 and merger
3 While principally employing an economic efficiency paradigm, the Court has not al-
ways been consistent or articulate in the evaluative process. Compare Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
4 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). This
article does not attempt an exhaustive review of antitrust law. Rather, it examines antitrust
analysis as it has developed under the central provisions of the antitrust laws.
5 See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979);
Sullivan, supra note 1.
6 See Adelstein, InstitutionalFunction and Evolution in the Cimizal Process, 76 Nw. U.L. REV.
1, 46 (1981).
7 See Pound, Mechanical jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). See alro Brecken-
ridge, Legal Positivism and the Natural Law: The Controversy Between Professor Hart and Professor
Fuller, 18 VAND. L. REV. 945, 948 (1965).
8 See E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES, PART 1 (1978).
9 See note 3 supra.
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questions under section seven of the Clayton Act. It has, however,
refrained from addressing the predation question under section two
of the Sherman Act. The Court must articulate the process and stan-
dards by which it will evaluate a section two charge of monopoliza-
tion or attempt to monopolize. Essentially, the Court will have to
define the minimum conduct threshold level that will trigger and sus-
tain a section two complaint against a dominant industry member.
Clear judicial guidelines serve to inhibit anticompetitive behavior
and enhance the laws' predictability. The failure to establish pre-
dictable antitrust guidelines may deter competitively desirable con-
duct out of fear of the laws' uncertainty.
II. Juristic Theories of Decisionmaking
A. Legal Positivism
One juristic theory of decisionmaking particularly prevalent in
the late nineteenth century but having continuing impact on con-
temporary judicial decisionmaking is legal positivism. To legal posi-
tivists, the law was an imperative or command from the sovereign
that established a positive standard.'0 Legal positivists confined the
legal process to merely finding the law, without an understanding or
evaluation of the competing social values that interact with the sov-
ereign imperatives. The positivist approach stated the law and ap-
plied it without reflecting on "socially preferable results."', Nonlegal
considerations were not permitted to inform the laws' content or pur-
pose. The universal and only influence on the decisionmaking pro-
cess was precedent deductively applied, 12 allowing precise outcomes
to be predicted.
B. Flexible Decsfonmaking: Holmes and Pound
In sharp contrast to legal positivists, Holmes noted that "[t]he
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 3 Both
10 See generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (2d ed.
1861); Kocourek, The Centug ofAnayticJurisprudence SinceJohn Austin, in LAW: A CENTURY OF
PROGRESS, 1835-1935 (1937); Kelsen, The Pure Teogi of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55
HARv. L. REV. 44 (1941).
11 See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY (3d ed. 1953); J. AUSTIN, supra note 10, at 118-90;
Breckenridge, supra note 7, at 948; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593,593-99 (1958); Pound, Law in Books andLaw in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12,
35-36 (1910).
12 See generally Pound, supra note 11.
13 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881). But see Adler, Legal Certainy, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 91, 107 & n.27 (1931).
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Holmes and Pound faulted positivism for its obsession with analyti-
cal logic and consistency and its refusal to invoke value-oriented poli-
cies, interests and experiences.14 For Holmes, the legal process t5
evoked forces beyond a jurisprudence that statically denied that law
implicates and is implicated by other social institutions. Holmes re-
jected the notion that law was or should be merely an imperative,
and argued forcibly that an informed and reasoned decisionmaking
process must include qualitative predictions and judgments based on
an open-ended inquiry including historical, social, and economic
consideration .16 Judicial decisionmaking was to embrace a rational
and informed process whereby competing interdisciplinary values
could be weighed and determined in their proper context.
Pound also recognized that legal positivism, though efficient and
predictable, too rigidly confined the decisionmaking process.
1 7
Pound observed:
It [legal positivism] confined the judge, when questions of law were
in issue, to the purely mechanical task of counting and of determin-
ing the numerical preponderance of authority. Principles were no
longer resorted to in order to make rules to fit cases. The rules were
at hand in a fixed and final form, and cases were to be fitted to the
rules. The classical jurisprudence of principles had developed, by
the very weight of its authority, a jurisprudence of rules; and it is in
the nature of rules to operate mechanically.18
For Pound, it would have been enough for a court to determine rules
which would control the operative facts of a given relationship with-
out announcing a universally applicable principle.' 9 Pound believed
that the governing rules should reflect a broad perspective, including
law's relationship to other contemporary social forces.
2 0
14 See generaly R. POUND, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 250-62 (1941); Pound, 4 Survq of
Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-10, 12-39 (1943). Pound urged that because law is "a
means toward an end, it must be judged by the results is achieves. . ., not by the beauty of
its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for
its foundation." Pound, supra note 7, at 605.
15 See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14 (1921).
16 O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210,
225 (1920).
17 Pound, supra note 7, at 607-08.
18 Pound, supra note 7, at 607. See also Pound, The Teoy ofjudiial Decirion (pts. 1-3), 36
HARv. L. REv. 641, 802, 940 (1923).
19 Pound, supra note 7, at 622 n.69. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the announcement of a new universal principle which
thereafter would be applied in the decision of the case).
20 G.E. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 67 (1978); Pound, Do We




Pound's theory of juristic decisionmaking focused on freeing the
process and context of law from predetermined conceptions. The
decisionmaking process had to be flexible enough to accommodate
changing social forces, conditions, and the practicalities of each case.
The legal process could not stand immune while other social forces
affected it or were affected by it.21
Pound's jurisprudential methodology of rationally and systemat-
ically interacting law with other social science disciplines, while cer-
tainly not universally accepted, was widely utilized and expanded.
One product of this development has been emphasis on empirical
evidence and quantitative prediction and verification.
C. Realism
Not long after Pound expanded on his model of the decisional
process, another group of writers, who shared Pound's interest in the
utility of scientific empiricism, advanced a "realist jurisprudence.
' 22
Realism, though advanced by many spokesmen who often dis-
agreed,23 rejected the positivists' syllogistic approach and rather em-
phasized more fact inquiry, including both facts in the instant case
and external facts that influenced or should have influenced the ulti-
mate outcome.2 4 For the realist, the law was the decisional process
itself, not the rules or principles that, according to the positivists,
shaped and determined the law.2 5 That decisional process was influ-
enced, the realists maintained, largely by intuitive and impressionis-
tic notions of the deciding judge.
2 6
21 Pound, The Scope andPurpose ofSociologicaljurisrudence (pts. 1-2), 24 HARV. L. Rav. 591
(1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912).
22 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL
THEORY 339 (5th ed. 1967); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); E. PATrERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF LAW 527 (1953); Dias, The Value ofa Value-Study of Law,
28 MODERN L. REV. 397, 400-01 (1965); Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17
(1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222 (193 1) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism]; Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930)[hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence]; Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REV. 317,
322-23 (1960); Stone, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1240, 1249-51 (1962) (reviewing R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959)).
23 Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 22, at 1229-35.
24 Clark, Methods of Legal Refonn, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 106 (1929); Clark, Present Status ofJudi-
cial Statistics, 14 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 84 (1930); Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70
YALE LJ. 1037 (1961).
25 Jones, Law and Aorality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-
02 (1961).
26 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100-1 (1930); G.E. WHITE, supra
note 20, at 116; Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); Hutcheson, The
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Llewellyn and Frank, the leading proponents of realism, argued
that the decisional process should embrace an empirical or behav-
ioral science approach.2 7 Through this approach, judging could di-
vorce, or at least attempt to divorce, itself from the intuitive
prejudices of the individual decisionmaker. Through scientific evalu-
ation, the realist hoped to advance a greater "awareness of the rela-
tionship between rules. . policy" and facts.28 Realists viewed "law
as an instrument for social action in a society constantly in flux."
'29
Since society was not static, its legal process could not remain affixed
to a deductive methodology based on an "a priori conception.
30
Legal realism attempted, as did Pound's sociological jurispru-
dence, to correct the one-dimensional normative or positivist ap-
proach of earlier jurists3I by interjecting social change into the
decisionmaking framework.32 "Extra-legal" factors33 implicated
other social science disciplines and institutions in the decisional pro-
cess. Both schools of judicial decisionmaking believed that the legal
process must be able to respond to social change and changing val-
ues. They differed, however, on the philosophical direction of deci-
sionmaking. Both schools shared the idea that qualitative factors
should aid in resolving conflicting values and interests, though the
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" inJudicz;alDeciion, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929);
Moore, Rational Basis ofLegal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1923); Yntema, The Horn-
book Method and the Conf'&t of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1927).
27 See Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisrudence, supra note 22, at 446 n. 12.
28 McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 834-
35 (1941) [hereinafter cited as McDougal, An Intervention]; Rostow, American Legal Realism and
the Sense ofthe Profession, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 123, 131-133 (1962). Professor McDougal
commented:
More clearly than any of their critics, the realists have appreciated that legal
rules are but the normative declarations of particular individuals, conditioned by
their own peculiar cultural milieu, and not truths revealed from on high. Most of
their writing has, in fact, been for the avowed purpose of freeing people from the
emotional compulsion of antiquated legal doctrine and so enabling them better to
pursue their hearts' desires. Not bothering to explain how judges can legislate, it is
they who have insisted that judges do and must legislate, that is, make a policy
decision, in every case. The major tenet of the "functional approach," which they
have so vigorously espoused, is that the law is instrumental only, a means to an end,
and is to be appraised only in the light of the ends it achieves.
McDougal, An Intervention, supra, at 834-35 (emphasis in original).
29 Rostow, supra note 28; see Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 22, at 1236.
30 See Pound, supra note 7, at 608.
31 E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1962).
32 Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism,supra note 22, at 1236-37; Yntema, sura note 22,
at 329.
33 Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 434-45 (1934). See Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism, supra note 22, at 1253-54.
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realist "preferred experimentation and empiricism to theorizing. '34
D. Anti-Realist Criticims
By the late 1930's, reaction to the realist jurisprudence was sub-
stantial.35 Many critics faulted the realists' devotion to and reliance
on quantitative theories and "questionable empirical findings,1
3 6
which center on exacting statistical investigations and mathematical
models.37 Critics observed that realism failed to address adequately
the proper boundaries that restrain the decisional process, and feared
that judicial self-indulgence and excesses would remain unchecked if
no constraints were placed on the judicial process. 38 Anti-realists
called for "reasoned elaboration" 39 within each judicial opinion to
determine whether judicial conclusions reasonably weighed the rele-
vant values and interests within an accepted framework of rules and
principles.4°
Wechsler's "neutral principles" 41 seemed to embody many of the
post-realist criticisms since the 1950's. The decisional process,
Wechsler asserted, had been reduced to an idiosyncratic methodol-
ogy wherein each decisionmaker achieved an ad hoc result without
benefit of "neutral principles" that would guide the judicial pro-
cess.42 According to Wechsler, a judicial result was "unprincipled"
unless it rested on analytical reasons supported by widely held be-
34 G.E. WHrrE, supra note 20, at 131. See generaly Adler, supra note 13; Pound, The Call
for a RealistJurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931).
35 G.E. WHITE, supra note 20, at 139.
36 Adler, supra note 13, at 92.
37 See Pound, supra note 34. But see Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 22,
at 1234 n.35. Llewellyn cites Cook as advocating a scientific approach for decisionmaking
and cites Oliphant as advocating an objective method for decisionmaking. See W.W. COOK,
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE LAW (1927); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decirir, 14 A.B.A.J. 71
(1928). In later years, leading exponents of realism attempted to espouse the importance of
empiricism in the legal process. J. FRANK, supra note 26, at xvii; Llewellyn, On Reading and
Using the Nvewer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 603 (1940). But Vf. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism, supra note 22, at 1229-30.
38 See generaloy H.M. HART &A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and theJudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1957); Fuller, Reason and iat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376 (1946); Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term--Foreword: The Time Chart ofjstices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1959); Jaffe, The
Supreme Court, 1950 Ten--Foreword, 65 HARv. L. REV. 107 (1951); Sacks, The Supreme Court,
1953 Tem---Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
39 See, e.g., H.M. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 38, at 161; White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
40 See note 38 supra.
41 Wechsler, supra note 38, at 1.
42 Id at 21.
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liefs. Decisions resting on intuitive predictions and convictions were
considered erroneous. The "tightly guided process" 43 of decision-
making based on "reasoned elaboration" and "neutral principles" re-
quired, in essence, that the jurist set forth clearly each step of the
analytical process by announcing and balancing the competing and,
perhaps, conflicting social policies and values present in the case.
This was to be accomplished by stating unequivocally any assump-
tions or prejudgments and by reaching a decision only if it rested on
a generally accepted consensus with regard to the ultimate values
and policies involved. 44
Wechsler's jurisprudential approach restrained policy develop-
ment and judicial prerogatives. Unless a "principled, reasoned anal-
ysis" supported the result obtained, judicial restraint became an
imperative. No decision regarding policies or values could be ren-
dered absent prior public consensus or precedent. A form of mechan-
ical jurisprudence had returned, and judicial abstention was thereby
institutionalized. Activism was enjoined, because the law's decisional
process could no longer serve as a means for achieving social ends.
Although the antirealist critique was directed at an activist style
of constitutional interpretation rather than legislative interpretation,
analogy to the early jurisprudential models and criticism aids in un-
derstanding the antitrust decisional process. The open-endedness of
the antitrust laws has encouraged a multifaceted weighing analysis
similar to constitutional decisionmaking, and the same analytical
criticisms apply. Courts must decide whether to interpret the open-
ended antitrust laws on a case-by-case, multiple factor weighing ba-
sis, or whether to develop a firm set of rules to fill in details omitted
by the legislative process. Ultimately, the answer may be dictated by
whether the courts' approach is faithful to the broad legislative
policy.
III. The Competition Model
A. From Equality to Efjtieny
One of the legacies of the Warren Court's antitrust jurispru-
dence was its split jurisprudential personality. The Court refused to
be bound by strict logic and rigid precedent, 45 and freely legislated
43 Griswold, Foreward Of Time and Atitudes-Professor Hart andJudge Arnold, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 81, 92 (1960).
44 White, supra note 39, at 286.




its own concepts of social policy within the open-ended antitrust stat-
utes. 4 6  The Court, however, was not antidoctrinal or
anticonceptual.
47
The Warren Court exhibited a realist enthusiam for empirical
economic data concerning industrial organization and how organiza-
tional structure could predict behavior. The Court also expressed
antirealist doctrine, particularly in its wide application of per se ille-
gality to thereby narrowly define the parameters of antitrust analy-
sis.48 The conclusive presumption of illegality explicit in the per se
approach rested on the intuitive policy conclusions and theoretical
postulates that certain conduct was inherently and perniciously an-
ticompetitive. By classifying certain conductfper se illegal, the Court
disavowed a jurisprudence that balanced competing interests and
policies.49  Application of absolute rules foreclosed subsequent
analysis.
The focus of the decisional process under the Burger Court is on
a positive economic analysis. However, unlike the Warren Court's
structural perspective, the present Court's analytical inquiry is di-
rected to an economic behavioral analysis centering on efficiency
objectives--whether the challenged conduct in the long run will fa-
cilitate market competition through increased efficiency.50 The
Court's emphasis on relative efficiency and competition foreshadows
a return to a rigid, quantitative economic approach as the predictor
of behavior.
Although qualitative factors such as policy, interest and experi-
ence are less well defined than quantifiable data, they nevertheless
may aid the decisionmaker in reconciling the interests sought to be
protected by the antitrust laws. Courts should weigh the sometimes
conflicting interests to afford the analytical flexibility needed in a
dynamic and pluralistic economy. Although this balancing analysis
46 See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
47 See Gilmore, supra note 24.
48 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911).
49 The Court's general unwillingness to balance competing interests was revealed in
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), in which the Court stated that it
was ill-equipped to undertake a balancing of competitive effects. Id at 609-10.
50 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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will increase the costs of dispute resolution, consideration of a broad
array of analytical factors increases the quality of the final judgment.
The Burger Court must confront whether historical and social
evidence should be accommodated and reconciled within an eco-
nomic and theoretical approach to antitrust analysis. The Court
must decide whether to permit qualitative factors to inform the pres-
ent economic decisionmaking approach, or whether to employ a nor-
mative standard of efficiency as the sole guideline for resolving
conflicts. As the following discussion indicates, the Burger Court's
antitrust analysis is presently broader than its predecessor's, but may
ultimately be as narrow and as normative.
1. Horizontal Arrangements: Price Fixing
The analytical shift from a "competition equality" policy to
"competition efficiency" paradigm is evident in the Court's horizon-
tal price fixing cases. The Burger Court has effected this change in
analytical perspective by broadening its analysis to permit greater
application of a rule of reason. Unfortunately, however, the Court
has not been consistent in its decisionmaking.
In the 1940 case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 51 the
Supreme Court held unequivocally that a conspiracy that "tampers
with the price structure" isperse unlawful. By applying this absolute
proscription, the Court chose to close all possible defenses that at-
tempt to weigh competing interests or policies.52 Notwithstanding
51 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In Socony, defendant oil companies agreed to purchase excess
gasoline from the spot market. The object of the conspiracy was to withdraw excess supply
from the market so that the tank wagon (wholesale) prices would not be depressed. Socony
presents the classic method by which prices can be affected through restrictions placed on
supply. See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (Justice
Stone held that price fixing, despite the reasonableness of the price, was illegal); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (Chief Justice White accepted implicitly an abso-
lute rule against cartel price fixing); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 570
(1898) (Justice Peckham employed implicitly a per se approach against cartel agreements);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a 'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (Judge Taft said that the "reasonableness" of the price was not subject to analysis by
courts under common law precedents).
52 In the earlier price fixing cases, Justice White argued for a broader judicial prerogative
in evaluating the restraint. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897), he dissented, stating that under certain circumstances price fixing may provide a so-
cial utility; one benefit, for example, was avoiding industry-wide price wars that had an over-
all ruinous effect on the industry. Id at 368 (White, J., dissenting).
The application of a clear proscription also served to clarify what conduct would be
condemned outright in the future, and thus chilled potential anticompetitive conduct. See
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 193-94 (1977); Oppenheim, Fed-
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the fact that the agreement did not set or peg price, the Court in
Socony reasoned that conduct which directly affects price has by its
nature and necessary effect no social utility and hence should be con-
demned without further consideration.
53
Shortly after Socony, the Warren Court employed aper se analysis
in United States v. Northern Pacifc Railway. 4 Speaking for the Court,
Justice Black observed that because of the nature of certain conduct,
the Court could project its pernicious consequences and condemn it
without requiring a "complicated and prolonged economic investiga-
tion into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries." 55 By adopting generalizations concerning the challenged
conduct, the Court was able to project that substantial competitive
injury would nearly always result.
The Court justified the per se approach on grounds of judicial
economy, efficiency, and cost effectiveness5 6 Its adoption demon-
strated the Court's firm reluctance to engage in a broad balancing
analysis. The Court made clear that it would entertain no social,
political, or economic policies or values to justify horizontal agree-
ments that tampered with price mechanisms. Regardless of whether
the defendant had the actual power to affect prices or whether the
conduct enhanced efficiency, the Court was satisfied that agreements
which create even the potential power to fix prices are per se unrea-
sonable. Further detailed inquiry was foreclosed.
57
In the development of the antitrust laws, problems quickly de-
veloped, however, in identifying whether the challenged arrange-
ment was a price fix within Socony's broad "tampering" standard.
Questions arose whether agreements that were attenuated from di-
rect price fixing arrangements or that had an indirect effect on prices
should be treated under the confining Socony approach. The central
factual inquiry became whether the challenged conduct constituted
an "agreement" within the meaning of section one of the Sherman
Act.58
eral Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Poliy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139,
1150-52 (1952).
53 310 U.S. at 224.
54 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951).
55 356 U.S. at 5.
56 Id.
57 Id See also United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Theatre
Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
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Throughout the Court's history, the breadth of the analytical
process seems directly related to two key factors: the attenuation of
the effect on price and the extent of the Court's experience with the
challenged activity.59 Whatever the conduct, however, the Court
had to determine whether the conduct facilitated collusion and carte-
lization. The analytical approach often dictated the result and be-
spoke of the interests and values the Court sought to espouse and
protect.
Even before the advent of the Warren Court jurisprudence, the
Court exhibited a normative interest in promoting competitive
equality. In doing so, the Court favored the open-ended rule of rea-
son approach. The classic case illustrating this methodology is Chi-
cago Board of Trade v. United States.6° In Chicago Board of Trade,
members of the Board of Trade entered into an agreement that re-
quired members who purchased grain after the Board closed to
purchase at the closing bid price.6' The Court upheld the conduct,
which otherwise could have been characterized as an agreement to
preclude price competition during the nonregular trading session, be-
cause it promoted competition by "perfecting market conditions,
'62
by regulating the Exchange's business hours, by breaking up a mo-
nopoly previously held by a limited number of warehouses that
purchased grain during nonregular hours, and by increasing the
number of possible transactions.63 Under earlier precedent,per se ille-
gality seemed clear, and no balancing of interests should have been
considered. However, Justice Brandeis cautioned that the decisional
process should be broad enough to weigh interests, policies, and
experience:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business . . .; its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
U.S. 683 (1948); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Sugar Inst.,
Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
59 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see also White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
60 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 240.
63 Id. at 240-41.
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the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained are all relevant facts.64
For Brandeis, this balancing approach should determine whether the
restraint is substantial enough to be deemed unreasonable.
By using a broadly-based decisional 'style, Justice Brandeis was
able to further those values perceived to be essential under section
one-the protection of small businesses in a pluralistic society in-
creasingly dominated by large business concerns. The Brandeis ap-
proach, though not its value orientation, served 65 as an important
guide for the Burger Court's decisional style.66
While sharing Justice Brandeis's realist concern for small busi-
nesses, the Warren Court invoked a far narrower approach in reach-
ing the same value-oriented result. By adopting a self limitingper .re
analytical style, the Court was able to avoid balancing business justi-
fications and policies. In this regard, the Warren Court's analysis
significantly differed from Justice Brandeis's realist tradition and the
Burger Court's efficiency approach.
In analyzing certain horizontal price arrangements, the Warren
Court adopted a structuralist approach to decisionmaking. The
Court valued the use of market structure to predict competitive be-
havior in cases where a nonexplicit agreement arguably facilitated
price collusion among competitors. By accepting certain industrial
organizational theories as a basis for predicting competitive effect,
the Court was able to reach conclusions about the challenged con-
duct within a framework that avoided weighing other economic and
social concerns.
Structuralism achieved its fullest acceptance in United States v.
Container Corp. ,67 a case concerning the competitive effects of dissemi-
nating market data among competitors. The Court in Container ad-
dressed whether the exchange of interseller price communications
was illegal under section one of the Sherman Act. In answering this
question, Justice Douglas reasoned that the exchange of price-related
64 Id at 238. See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
65 Some commentators have suggested that Chicago Board of Trade was an aberration and
that it was implicitly overruled by Trenton Potteries. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 52, at 181,
186; see also Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 9 (1979).
66 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
67 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See generally Sullivan, First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation,
46 Mo. L. REv. 517, 555-58 (1981).
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data in a concentrated industry tends to stabilize prices.68 The eco-
nomic theory underlying the Court's reasoning suggested that the
disclosure of price information among competitors in a highly con-
centrated market will further interdependence among the competi-
tors, thus increasing the anticompetitive consequences. The Court
found that although there had been a downward trend in market
prices, the exchange of current prices in that market actually stabi-
lized prices to thereby deter price competition. Relying on structural
evidence such as low elasticity of demand for a homogeneous product
in a concentrated market where competition centered on price, Jus-
tice Douglas found a section one price fix.
The Court's economic rationale that there is "predisposition to-
ward collusion in a concentrated market" severely limited its analy-
sis.69 This economic approach suggested a decisional style havingper
se qualities. The Court implicitly interjected its own social and eco-
nomic values into the decisionmaking process. Paradoxically, it also
limited the weighing of other interests or policies such as efficiency
and performance.
In two recent decisions, the Burger Court has rejected Container's
limiting decisionmaking style in price exchange cases. 70 Opting for a
broader analysis than pure structuralist methodology, the Burger
Court has recognized that "[t]he exchange of price data and other
information among competitors does not invariably have anticompe-
titive effects; indeed such practices can in certain circumstances in-
crease economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less
competitive. ' 71 Thus, in data exchange cases which implicate price
fixing agreements, the present Court has reverted back to the Chicago
Board of Trade rule of reason approach 72 as the analytical measure
through which it will advance competition through efficiency. The
Court has not wholly rejected the utility of structural data,73 but
68 393 U.S. at 336-37. Eighteen manufacturers of corrugated containers were found to
control 90% of the container production in the United States.
69 Sullivan, supra note 67, at 558.
70 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
71 438 U.S. at 441 n.16.
72 See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 588 (1925); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Amer-
ican Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
73 See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 (1979) (a Robinson-Pat-
man Act case in which the Court considered the oligopolistic market structure to determine
competitive effect if buyer were required to disclose to seller a competitor's bid price). For
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rather is far less inclined to embrace structuralism as a short cut ana-
lytical tool. It continues to analyze conduct in light of structure, but
it now seems more ready to inquire into actual competitive condi-
tions to determine whether the exchange has procompetitive effects.
74
In addition to rejecting aper se approach in data dissemination
cases, the Burger Court has broadened its analysis in areas where the
Court had insufficient experience with the challenged conduct,
where the challenged agreements did not directly affect price, or
where the agreements facilitated operation of a market. Several cases
signal the Court's interest in advancing efficiency and performance
over competitive equality as the normative standard to regulate busi-
ness behavior. In each decision, the Court's underlying premise has
been that economic efficiency should be optimized. The Court has
rejected Socony's strict analytical methodology, resulting in an uncer-
tain jurisprudential approach.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,75 the Court held that a minimum
fee schedule which had been published by a county bar association
and endorsed by the state bar constituted a price fixing arrangement
under section one of the Sherman Act. Goldfarb, however, does not
reveal the analysis employed in reaching this result. In writing for
the full Court, Chief Justice Burger failed to articulate whether the
Court applied the Socony per se approach or the broader-based rule of
reason. After noting that the fee schedule was not merely advisory,
Justice Burger buttressed his opinion by observing that the trial court
had found that the fee schedule and its enforcement mechanism re-
strained trade. 76 The scope of analysis was unclear because Justice
Burger at one point in the opinion concluded that the minimum fee
schedule was a "naked agreement," language generally used to con-
noteperse illegality, and at another place in the opinion implied that
per se analysis should not be invoked when the conduct occurs within
a profession rather than a business.
77
Chief Justice Burger's deferential tone suggests that the Court
example, the exchange may increase competitors' and customers' access to information re-
garding price, demand, and supply, and reduce barriers to market entry.
74 Sullivan, supra note 67, at 560.
75 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
76 Id at 778.
77 The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the profes-
sions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect,
and other features of the profession, may require that a particular practice, which
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might justify some restraints on a public interest basis. The opinion
implicitly indicated that the Court would adopt, at least for profes-
sions, a broader decisional analysis which would balance and per-
haps accommodate noneconomic interests and policies.
The Court's deferential attitude toward professions was reaf-
firmed in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States. 78 In
Professional Engineers, the government charged that a canon of ethics,
which prohibited member engineers from submitting project bids
prior to an employment contract, was a restraint of trade under sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act. 79 The defendant urged the Court to
adopt a rule of reason analysis which would weigh noneconomic fac-
tors such as public safety against the restraint imposed by the canon.
The Court declined to adopt such a broad analysis, though it did
concede that summary analysis was too restrictive.
Relying on earlier pronouncements by Justice Brandeis, Justice
Stevens, speaking for the Court, stated that the Court should
broaden the application of its rule of reason balancing analysis to
accommodate restraint issues when raised in the context of a profes-
sion. While the Court acknowledged a need to be less rigid in its
initial approach, Justice Stevens cautioned that the decisional analy-
sis could only be broad enough to inquire as to the "competitive sig-
nificance of the restraint.
'80
There are. . . two complementary categories of antitrust analysis.
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary ef-
fect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality - they are "illegalper
se." In the second category are agreements whose competitive ef-
fect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed. In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is
not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public
interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry.81
The Court declined to permit the analytical inquiry to procede be-
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently.
Id at 788 n. 17. See also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-87
(1978).
78 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
79 The canon was defended on the assertion that competitive bidding would result in
inferior engineering work, thus jeopardizing public welfare and safety. Id. at 685 n.7.




yond an economic analysis of the agreement's competitive impact.
The "quality product" defense was excluded because it did not in-
crease efficiency or competition.8 2 Flexibility in the decisional pro-
cess was foreclosed because the underlying assumption of the
Sherman Act implicitly dictates that "competition will produce not
only lower prices, but also better goods and services. 8S3 A weighing of
public interest considerations such as the public safety factors would
be beyond the judicial prerogative and "would be tantamount to a
repeal of the statute.
'8 4
Professional Engineers illustrates the Court's changing analysis of
horizontal restraints. Prior to the decision, the Court consistently ap-
plied a narrow analysis where the nature of the agreement affected
price competition. There was little doubt that an agreement which
eliminated price competition, while not a direct price fix, would di-
rectly affect price and was proscribed under Socony. Yet, the Burger
Court in Professional Engineers applied a broader analysis, only there-
after to confine the analysis strictly within an economic framework
which weighed competitive harms against economic benefits.
According to Professional Engineers, the nature of the competition
defines the parameters of antitrust analysis. The range of decisional
options includes only whether the agreement which produced the re-
straint was "plainly anticompetitive" or, if not, whether the restraint
produced a net anticompetitive result. The narrow balancing stan-
dard under the latter inquiry leaves no room to evaluate
noneconomic defenses, such as quality control or public safety. So-
cial benefits are not to be weighed against competitive factors. Ac-
cording to the Burger Court, only Congress may weigh interests,
policies and experience.
8 5
82 See id at 691 n.17.
83 Id at 695.
84 Id In focusing its analysis solely on competitive impact, the Court explained:
The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating in a free market
recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-
and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to
select among alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the pre-
sumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad.
Id
85 Id at 695-96. Because defendant did not claim that the ban on competitive bidding
enhanced competition, it failed to meet the competitive impact balancing test. This narrow
rule of reason seems facially inconsistent with Justice Brandeis's famous language articulating
the scope of the analysis in Chicago Board of Trade. See Baxter, Placing the Burger Court in HiMtori-
calPerspective, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 803 (1978). See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
344-45 (1979) (the Court refused to weigh, under section four of the Clayton Act, the interests
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The Court's analytical style in Professional Engineers raised several
immediate interpretative questions: first, whether the Court would
apply the rule of reason analysis to business conduct outside a profes-
sion where the direct effect interfered with price competition; second,
whether the decisional process outside the professional context would
continue to be limited solely to economic criteria; and third, whether
all professional conduct was immunized from per se scrutiny. The
resolution of these issues was critical because many believed Socony
implicitly overruled or historically confined the earlier rule of reason
pronouncements in Chicago Board of Trade and Appalachian Coals con-
cerning legal restraints affecting prices.86 Although Professional Engi-
neers put to rest these assumptions, it raised the question whether
Socony had vitality after Professional Engineers s7 A partial answer was
forthcoming the next year.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System ,88 the Bur-
ger Court continued to use a broader antitrust analysis. The Court
extended the rule of reason approach outside the professions by ap-
plying it to a blanket licensing arrangement. CBS, a licensee, chal-
lenged such an arrangement as an illegal price fix. When CBS
sought to bring the blanket licensing agreement within the per se
analysis, defendants argued that the blanket license agreement was
procompetitive because it sought to facilitate orderly and efficient
operation of the market. 89 The Court cautioned that it would not
apply the Socony per se characterization of illegality, and hence the
narrower decisionmaking model, in a horizontal restraint case until
the Court had had considerable experience with the challenged con-
and policies involved in the issue whether "the cost of defending consumer class actions will
have a potentially ruinous effect on small business and [whether the cost] will ultimately be
paid by consumers.").
86 Socony said that price is the "central nervous system of the economy." 310 U.S. at 226
n.59. Container cautioned that an agreement that "interfere[s] with the setting of price by free
market forces" is illegal on its face. 393 U.S. at 337.
87 See note 70 supra.
88 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) were organizations whose membership included per-
forming artists. Performing artists used member organizations as "clearing houses" for
copyright owners and users to license the use of their performance rights. The "blanket li-
cense" given by the organizations permitted licensees to use each and every composition
owned by a member of the organization for a standard fee. The fee did not directly depend
upon actual usage. CBS held blanket licenses from these organizations. CBS sought to rene-
gotiate the licensing arrangement on a per use base price. When each of the licensing organi-
zations refused to renegotiate, CBS brought suit arguing that the blanket license was aper se
price fix.
89 Id See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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duct.90 Upon reflection, Justice White, writing for the Court, rea-
soned that the strict per se analysis was inapplicable in this context,
even though the conduct concededly was "literally" a price fixing
arrangement, because the economic realities of the industry required
this kind of market arrangement to effectuate the rights that were
granted by Congress. 9 1
While the scope of the Court's analysis sweeps beyond theper se
standard, the analysis is confined to economic considerations. Broad-
cast Music indicates that the rule of reason analysis restrains the
Court to inquire only whether the challenged conduct will result in a
net procompetitive effect. The Court stressed that the focus must be
whether the practice is "designed to increase economic efficiency and
render markets more rather than less competitive. ' 92 Under this effi-
ciency paradigm, the Court found that the blanket license arrange-
ment produced cost efficiencies in the monitoring and integration of
sales and in enforcement against unauthorized copyright use9 3 that
could not have been achieved by individual composers. Therefore,
although the collusive arrangement destroyed "competitive pricing
as a free market's means of allocating resources," the Court, by nar-
rowing its decisional analysis to include only efficiency criteria, was
able to remand the case and conclude that the challenged practice
created a new market "in which individual composers [were] inher-
ently unable to fully effectively compete."'94 On remand the Second
Circuit applied the Court's efficiency standard to hold that the blan-
ket licensing did not create an unreasonable restraint,95 because the
individual transaction costs were too high for individual licensing to
work competitively.
Clearly, the decisional process employed by the Burger Court in
Professional Engineers and Broadcast Music has produced a significant
90 441 U.S. at 19 n.33.
91 Id at 19. It is interesting to note that Justice White was one of the members of the
Court who consistently embraced the Warren Court antitrust jurisprudence. See id. at 8-9;
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2480, 2481-84 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
92 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,441
n.16 (1978)). But cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 594-95,
599, 602-06 (1925) (the Court employed a far broader standard which was not limited to
whether the challenged conduct would increase economic efficiency). See also McCann v.
New York Stock Exch., 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939).
93 441 U.S. at 21.
94 Id at 23.
95 CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Second Circuit also found that since the blanket license did not prohibit individual com-
posers from obtaining direct licensing, the arrangement did not eliminate price competition.
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analytical shift. Each decision bespeaks a gradual change in philo-
sophical direction. Per se analysis gave way to broader application of
the rule of reason in a process that values economic efficiency as the
normative standard for the decisional analysis. These cases indicate
that the Burger Court will apply its efficiency-oriented rule of reason
model in certain horizontal restraint contexts in order to weigh the
competitive harm against the economic benefit even when the chal-
lenged conduct directly affects price competition.
96
In cases where the effect on competition is indirect and subject
to conflicting inferences, the majority of the Court seems to discount
the behavior cost (costs associated with monopoly power which in-
crease when competition is lessened) and simply consider efficiency.
When the anticompetitive behavior is direct, such as price fixing, the
Court discounts the efficiency argument and considers, at least im-
plicitly, the behavior cost involved in the restraint. The problem lies
in the intermediate cases where the economic injury is inexact. Eco-
nomic theory provides only limited guidance for determining what
constitutes a direct price fixing agreement and which decisional anal-
ysis to employ.97 These difficulties may explain the Court's most re-
cent decisions.
In the 1979 Term, the Court in a per curiam opinion summarily
reversed a court of appeals decision which had held that a horizontal
agreement to eliminate credit was not necessarily a price fixing ar-
rangement and hence not per se unlawful.98 Reasoning that interest-
free credit was the equivalent of a discount and thus an inseparable
part of the price, the Court in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., con-
cluded that "[a]n agreement to terminate the practice of giving
credit is . . . tantamount to an agreement to eliminate discounts,
and thus falls squarely within the traditional per se" analysis.99 The
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that the restraint should
be weighed against procompetitive benefits of lowered entry barriers
96 The Court in Broadcast Music conceded that ASCAP had power to and did in fact set
the price for the blanket license. 441 U.S. at 20. The ultimate holding in BrofessionalEngineers
made it clear that the agreement not to engage in competitive bidding had the effect of
maintaining prices, and therefore violated section one of the Sherman Act. 435 U.S. at 692-
93.
97 The line-drawing seems to center on how attenuated the agreement is from a direct
price fixing arrangement and whether there is market interference with a price component.
98 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). The district court entered an
interlocutory order which denied plaintiff's motion for the court to analyze the conduct under
a per se illegality standard. The order was certified to the Ninth Circuit under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).
99 446 U.S. at 648.
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and increased visibility of prices.'00 The Court instead returned to
the narrow Socony analysis, but it did so largely by relying on prior
cases wherein the Court had applied the broader rule of reason
analysis.' 10
The Catalano Court recognized that the directness of the impact
on price may be a central factor dictating the correct analytical
style. While stating that "[w]e have held agreements to be unlawful
per se that had substantially less direct impact on prices than the
agreement alleged in this case,"' 1 2 the Court concluded nevertheless
that if the challenged conduct has an effect on an inseparable compo-
nent of the price, the only question open for consideration is whether
the conduct occurred.1
0 3
The Court employed similar reasoning during the 1981 Term
when the Court addressed whether a maximum fee schedule for
health services provided to policyholders of certain insurance plans
wasperse illegal. The Court, in a 4-3 decision, held in Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society104 that an agreement among competing
doctors to set the maximum fees charged under health insurance
plans constituted a per se violation. Rejecting Broadcast Music argu-
ments that the agreement had efficiency-enhancing justifications that
benefited consumers, Justice Stevens opined that the Court had not
"wavered in [its] enforcement of the per se rule against price
fixing."' 10 5 Citing Catalano and previous maximum price fixing
cases, 0 6 the Court concluded that establishing a maximum price was
just as pernicious as agreeing to fix minimum or uniform prices,
though the Court recognized that the economic rationale may differ.
The Court explained:
100 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979).
101 For example, the Court stated "that the agreement was just as plainly anticompetitive
as a direct agreement to raise prices. Consequently, no further inquiry under the rule of
reason. . . was required in order to establish the agreement's unlawfulness," by citing Profes-
sional Engineers, Broadcast Mic, and Northern PacifWc, rule of reason cases. 446 U.S. at 645-46.
Moreover, the Court cited Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) as aper se
case, when in fact the Court never employed that terminology.
102 A46 U.S. at 647.
103 Id at 648. The Court concluded that though the effect might have been an indirect
price increase, the "agreement was just as plainly anticompetitive as a direct agreement to
raise prices." Id at 645-46 (quoting favorably Catalano, 605 F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Blumenfeld, J., dissenting)).
104 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). A divided Ninth Circuit had ruled that Catalano'sperse analy-
sis did not apply. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 559-60 (9th Cir.
1981).
105 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
106 Id. (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)).
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The per se rule 'is grounded on the faith in price competition as a
market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price
of eliminating competition.' In this case the rule is violated by a
price restraint that tends to provide the same economic rewards to
all practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their
training, or their willingness to employ innovative and different
procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also may discour-
age entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new
developments by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquer-
ade for an agreement to fix uniform prices, or it may in the future
take on that character.107
Though citing case precedent to maintain a per se analysis in
price fixing cases, the Court was not confined by Goldfarb and Profes-
sional Engineers in evaluating professional conduct. Concluding that
the challenged conduct was not "premised on public service or ethi-
cal norms,"' 08 the Court did not hesitate to apply the per se analysis
to the medical profession. Consequently, horizontal maximum price
fixing is per se unlawful regardless of whether it is engaged in by
members of a profession. The notion that the Court would analyti-
cally distinguish professional conduct from that of other competitors
seemed to have lost force in Maricopa, at least with regard to price
fixing restraints. Curiously, however, the Court suggested that such a
distinction might survive under a rule of reason balancing approach
if the restraint was premised on noncommercial objectives such as
public service or ethical norms, or if the restraint would enhance pro-
fessional service.10 9
The Court's analysis in Catalano and Maricopa is not fully consis-
tent with the decisional styles in Professional Engineers and Broadcast
Music. 110 In both Catalano and Maricopa, the Court refused to weigh
107 102 S. Ct. at 2475 (quoting Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Airing Rule, 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 137, 142 (1962)) (citation omitted). Apparently, the Department of Justice urged the
Court that "horizontal maximum price fixing is per se illegal, unless 'the proponents of the
agreement have shown it to be necessary to some integration of productive capacity.' " Doc-
tors' Maximum Fee Agreements with Approved Insurers are Subject of Supreme Court Arguments, [July-
Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1038, at DD-2 (Nov. 5, 1981)(emphasis
added). See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 613 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
108 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
109 Id To weigh noncommercial objectives against the competitive harm would conflict
directly with the central holding of Professional Engineers and Broadcast Music.
110 See text accompanying notes 78-96 supra. In Professional Engineers, the Court reasoned
that the ban on competitive bidding was not price fixing, even though the ban unquestiona-
bly had an anticompetitive effect. 435 U.S. at 692. Because the Court considered the busi-




the economic effects of the agreement as it had in Professional Engi-
neers and Broadcast Music. The Court offered no "reasoned elabora-
tion" regarding how the decisional approach employed in Catalano
and Maricopa can be reconciled with the analysis of Broadcast Music
and Professional Engineers 
II
Although distinctions do seem apparent between Broadcast Music
and Maricopa, the Court did not rest its opinion on them. The Court
could have held in Maricopa that the price plan, while perhaps pro-
moting economies and benefiting consumers, need not have included
doctors. The doctors' participation in the pricing scheme was not
essential to the desired procompetitive effects. 112 This element of in-
dispensability seemed critical to the Broadcast Music analysis regard-
ing the market effectiveness of the blanket license agreement.
Accordingly, the main distinction could have been drawn on whether
the agreement was necessary to achieve the desired efficiencies or
whether less restrictive means were available. The Court instead re-
frained from reconciling the unelaborated distinctions in its recent
cases.
Labeling certain conduct "price fixing" in one case so to find it
without redeeming value and not to so label it in another, though the
probable effect in both instances may be price stability or uniformity,
does not create a decisional standard that can easily guide subse-
quent litigation. Although Catalano and Maricopa are fully consistent
with Socony and the result achieved in Professional Engineers, the analy-
sis employed is inconsistent with Professional Engineers and Broadcast
Music. At best, the approach lacks systematic criteria for reviewing
horizontal price-affecting cases. The result can only lead to ambigu-
111 Perhaps one reason for the lack of a clear statement justifying the distinctions between
the cases is the fact that Catalano was decided by summary reversal on a petition for certiorari
that did not allow the parties to file briefs on the merits or argue the case orally. In Maricopa
the issue was presented by way of summary judgment motion. Nevertheless, the Court failed
to address why it was able in the earlier cases to balance the procompetitive impact of the
challenged practice against the restraint imposed in order to determine net competitive effect.
The analysis employed in Broadcast Music and Professional Engineers would have required
the Court in Catalano to weigh the competitive effect of reduced entry barriers and increased
competition against the possible price increases resulting from the withdrawal of credit. Cata-
ano declined to sanction such a decisionmaking approach. Likewise, in Maricopa, the Court
refused to weigh the economic effects of the agreement as it had in Professional Engineers and
Broadcast Music. The Court's attempted distinction of Broadcast Music was unpersuasive. First,
the Court implicitly rejected Broadcast Music's reasoning thatper se rules should not be applied
intuitively to condemn novel conduct in which the Court had no previous experience. Sec-
ond, the Court said that in Broadcast Music there was little, if any, competition between indi-
vidual composers, while it noted that the doctors in Maricopa were in competition. -441 U.S.
at 9-10.
112 102 S. Ct. at 2478, 2479 n.33.
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ous and inconsistent benchmarks which lack the essential elements of
predictability.
It remains unclear whether the Court has now implicitly con-
fined its broad-based analysis in Professional Engzizeers and Broadcast
Music to the facts in those cases or whether the Court is ready to
return to the per se approach regarding all horizontal price-affecting
conduct regardless of how direct the effect on price. Although the
classification process regarding the nature of the challenged conduct
has repeatedly determined the scope of the analysis, the standards
under which conduct will be classified "price fixing" remain unar-
ticulated. Maricopa illustrates the Court's analytical tensions con-
cerning antitrust goals and values. The majority in Maricopa viewed
competition as the principal goal of antitrust and was concerned with
whether the agreement created restraints which by their nature inter-
fere with the right of individual competitors in the market. For the
majority, interference with such an essential market factor as price
competition was enough to mandate summary analysis. The three
dissenting justices, however, more highly value allocative efficiency
as a goal of antitrust analysis. They regard the Sherman Act as a
"consumer welfare prescription,"' 13 calling for efficiency and per-
formance criteria as the sole standard upon which competition
should be judged. For them, per se analysis is inappropriate without
first "carefully considering the substantial benefits and procompeti-
tive justifications"'1 4 that may serve the consumer welfare.
As these section one cases have indicated, differing jurispruden-
tial approaches have on several occasions merged to produce a new
antitrust majority which has required a harm-benefit analysis before
classifying or condemning the conduct. In other instances, where this
majority has been lacking, a narrower, less detailed economic analy-
sis has been employed which focuses on whether there has been mar-
ket interference with price competition. Whether the Court will
accept the efforts to explain competition under an analysis foreshad-
owed in Professional Engineers and Broadcast Music remains unclear.
The Court ultimately must decide as a matter of policy whether the
analysis in the horizontal context should include a structured factual
and economic inquiry which weighs the interests and policies regard-
ing economies achieved through reducing price competition. In
113 Id at 2485 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979)). The Reiter Court was confronted with the single issue of whether consumers have
standing under section four of the Clayton Act by reason of being injured in their business or
property. The Court held that they did.
114 102 S. Ct. at 2483 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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short, the Court's jurisprudential style for antitrust decisionmaking
must resolve the changing, and often conflicting, values regarding
how to define competition.
2. Vertical Restraints
The Burger Court's interpretative approach in vertical restraint
cases best exemplifies the Court's jurisprudential change from anti-
trust convention. The Court has vividly rejected the Warren Court
precedents, which valued a realist populism for promoting equality
in competition. In contrast, the present Supreme Court in a post-
realist fashion has advanced a normative standard of economic effi-
ciency as the .preferred predictive model for defining competition
protected by the antitrust laws. This normative paradigm has been
evident in the vertical restraint decisional law since 1977 and is
reaching new heights under current enforcement efforts.
a. Nonpfrice Market Restrictions
The tension between the Warren and Burger Courts regarding
the methodology by which the dynamic competitive process should
be judicially evaluated became evident early in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's tenure. In United States v. Toco Associates, Inc. ,115 the Court ad-
dressed the legality of territorial market allocation among
supermarket chains selling Topco-brand products. The majority of
the Court applied a narrow summary analysis to declare the market
division aper se violation of the Sherman Act. In the positivist tradi-
tion, the Court considered itself bound by earlier case precedent,"1
6
and felt ill-situated to balance the relative competing interests and
evidentiary data that were implicated in territorial restraint cases."1
7
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall cautioned:
If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of
the economy for greater competition in another portion, this too is
a decision which must be made by Congress and not by private
forces or by the courts. . . . To analyze, interpret, and evaluate
the myriad of competing interests and the endless data which
would surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the
delicate judgment on the relative values to society of competitive
areas of the economy, thejudgment of the elected representatives of
the people is required." 8
115 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
116 Id at 608.
117 Id at 609-10.
118 Id at 611-12.
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Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the Court's per se applica-
tion, and his dissent in Topco signalled the general decisional analysis
that was to follow. Chief Justice Burger observed that cursory analy-
sis was inappropriate because the Court, under the open-ended man-
date of the Sherman Act, was required first to consider "the relevant
economic realities in light of the basic policy and goals of the Sher-
man Act."'" 9 According to Chief Justice Burger, prior decisions had
not foreclosed a broad economically-oriented policy analysis center-
ing on competitive factors. Consequently, Chief Justice Burger be-
lieved the decisional approach should weigh the economic impact
that "the condemned practices may have on competition."
1 20
In essence, Chief Justice Burger urged the Court to employ a full
factual and economic balancing analysis in each case so that the rela-
tive competitive factors could be adjudged on their own merits
within the given industrial market.1 2  Economic factors were to in-
form the antitrust law's content and purpose. If the challenged prac-
tice promoted cost-saving efficiencies, the Court was to weigh these
benefits against the severity of the restraint. The narrow per se rule
of illegality, established for "judicial convenience and ready predict-
ability,"'' 22 was beginning to erode. Apparently, Chief Justice Burger
believed that the summary analysis had no utility unless the chal-
lenged practice lacked any redeeming merit.
23
In Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,124 the Burger Court
rejected theper se approach as it applied to nonprice vertical restric-
tions. The television set manufacturer in Sylvania limited the loca-
tions at which its franchised retailers could sell. Applying a strictper
se analysis, the lower courts did not engage in a balancing analysis to
consider whether the distributional restraint imposed on the retailer
in the intrabrand market could promote marketing efficiencies in the
interbrand television market.
25
119 Id at 614-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
120 Id at 620.
121 For example, Justice Burger, relying on the district court's findings, would consider in
evaluating the territorial limitations that the purpose of the cooperative endeavor was to
further interbrand competition by enhancing through quality control and volume purchasing
the individual members' ability to compete against brands of national chains. Id at 613-14.
Since these economic factors promoted competition in the interbrand market, they were high-
ly relevant, Chief Justice Burger contended, in assessing the overall competitive and public
(consumer) welfare. Any narrower analysis would blindly lead to a preordained result at
odds with the reality of the competitive marketplace.
122 Id at 614-15.
123 Id at 621 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
124 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
125 The lower courts considered themselves bound by United States v. Arnold Schwinn &
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. In rejecting the per se approach, the Burger Court clearly en-
dorsed an analysis which values economic efficiency as a principal
goal of antitrust law. The decisional focus requires the reviewing
court to weigh economic interests, policies, and factual variables in
determining whether the "[v]ertical restriction [will] promote inter-
brand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
[marketing] efficiencies." ' 12 6 Sylvania instructs that distributional and
marketing economies are "redeeming virtues" 12 7 within Northern Pa-
coc's proscription against applying aper se analysis.
Central to the Court's analysis in Sylvania was the concern that
Co., 388 U.S.. 365 (1967), in which the Warren Court held that vertical territorial and cus-
tomer arrangements that restricted a dealer's resale freedom should be analyzed under theper
se approach without weighing the competitive interests or effects.
126 433 U.S. at 54. The Burger Court's economic basis for permitting the rule of reason
analysis in vertical nonprice cases is as follows:
Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of
sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers.
Location restrictions have this effect because of practical constraints on the effective
marketing area of retail outlets. Although intrabrand competition may be reduced,
the ability of retailers to exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the
ability of consumers to travel to other franchised locations and, perhaps more im-
portantly, to purchase the competing products of other manufacturers. None of
these key variables, however, is affected by the form of the transaction by which a
manufacturer conveys his products to the retailers.
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufac-
turer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These "re-
deeming virtues" are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under
the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufac-
turers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufac-
turers. For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets
can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to
make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distri-
bution of products unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use
them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service
and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service
and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and major household
appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's
goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of-market imperfections
such as the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might not be provided by
retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's bene-
fit would be greater if all provided the services than if none did.
Id at 54-55 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
The Court emphasized that Sylvania's ability to compete in the interbrand market
would be enhanced if it could, through distributional restrictions, overcome the free-rider
dilemma by optimizing dealer advertising, promotion, and services. This analytical refine-
ment is based on the economic theory that vertical distributional restrictions may increase
product diversification and service to retail customers. The restrictions may also permit a
new manufacturer to increase competition by permitting it to induce its dealers to market the
new product more aggressively.
127 433 U.S. at 54.
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the Warren Court's decisions lacked "objective benchmarks" from
which antitrust policy could evolve. 12 8 Since Sylvana, economic mar-
ket factors have become the centerpiece of antitrust policy and analy-
sis. However, Sylvania does not dictate that market efficiency is the
only permissible criterion. The Court explicitly cautioned that such
a decisional framework "is not the only legilzimate reason for a manu-
facturer's desire to exert control over the manner in which . . . prod-
ucts are sold and serviced."' 2 9 The Court implied that other criteria
such as safety and quality of products might be relevant in a non-
price vertical case, even absent evidence of efficiency. 130
The Court in Sylvania did not set forth precise standards for ap-
plying the new analysis in vertical restraint cases. It did cite approv-
ingly the continued validity of Chicago Board of Trade's wide-open
balancing approach.1 3' As discussed previously, however, the Burger
Court's most recent interpretation of Chicago Board of Trade in Profes-
sional Engineers and Broadcast Music strongly indicates that the balanc-
ing analysis, at least in horizontal restraint cases, is limited to
weighing only economic efficiency factors to determine whether the
challenged practice would produce a net procompetitive effect. 132 In
the cases involving vertical restraints, the analysis would weigh the
severity of the restraint in the same or intrabrand product market
against the increased competition among competitors in the inter-
128 Id at 53 n.21.
129 Id at 55 n.23 (emphasis added).
130 In raising concerns for product safety, the Court cited Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425
F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970). In Tripoli, the Circuit Court upheld
summary judgment for a manufacturer which had imposed vertical customer restraints to
protect against serious physical injury to customers and to insulate the manufacturer from
product liability suits. See also Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637
F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 119 (1981); Del Rio Distrib. Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); Clairol, Inc. v.
Boston Discount Center, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 632 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aj'd, 608 F.2d 1114 (6th
Cir. 1979). Cf. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Clairol, Inc. v. Cosmetics
Plus, 130 N.J. Super. 81, 325 A.2d 505 (1974).
131 433 U.S. at 49.
132 See text accompanying note 96 supra. This conclusion is supported by the Court's
citation to the economic and legal literature of scholars identified with the Chicago School of
antitrust analysis, which generally argues that competitive efficiency and consumer welfare
are the only goals of antitrust policy. See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Time of Change.- From
White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept. Price Fixing and Market Division (II), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Pollock, Alternative
Distribution Methods After Schwoinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic
Analysis and Public Poli Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506 (1965).
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brand or generic product market. 33
In sum, Sylvania permits a more realist-oriented weighing analy-
sis and reflects the Court's consumer-directed value orientation. The
Court values not whether a restraint is imposed on intrabrand com-
petition, or whether retail dealers enjoy full autonomy from a larger
manufacturer, or whether some intrabrand dealer will be unable to
compete with another in that brand;134 rather, the Court's concern is
whether the restraint will promote interbrand competition to ulti-
mately benefit consumers through lower prices and better service.
This analysis may also protect small business franchises who, but for
the franchise restrictions, may be denied a position in the market by
the manufacturer opting for vertical integration. As long as a viable
interbrand market exists, intrabrand retailers will be unable "to ex-
ploit the resulting market" because consumers will be able to substi-
tute "competing products of the other manufacturers."' 135 To the
extent that a healthy interbrand market does not exist, evidenced by
a monopoly, the Court will be more concerned about market
restrictions.
The key to understanding the Burger Court's decisional style is
to distinguish between vertical restraints on intrabrand competition
that may promote overall market competition in the industry, and
horizontal agreements that interfere with interbrand competition.
The analysis must be focused, however, to expose and condemn verti-
cal agreements that have a horizontal effect of restraining output or
raising interbrand prices.
Although the present Court's analysis values practices which en-
hance interbrand competition, the Court has receded from the earlier
policy orientation of analyzing a trade restraint within the frame-
work of whether it interfered with dealer independence. The ques-
tion remains whether the Burger Court's new analysis will result in a
quantitative approach as rigid as the mechanical jurisprudence of
earlier times.
133 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
134 The Sylvania Court, aware of the Warren Court's populist attitude toward protecting
small businessmen and their independence, observed that Schwinn's per se rule could hurt
small businessmen by preventing a firm "from using the franchise system to achieve efficien-
cies ... [and by increasing the] incentive for vertical integration ... thereby eliminating
• . .the role of the independent businessmen." Id at 57 n.26. See also Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20-21 (1964) (Justice Douglas discusses the importance of protecting retail
dealers).
135 433 U.S. at 54.
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b. Resale Pice Maintenance
The language in Sylvania made it clear that the Court did not
entirely foreclose the opportunity to apply aper se analysis to certain
vertical restrictions. 136 The Court in dictum commented that 'er se
illegality of price restrictions has been established . . and involves
significantly different questions of analysis and policy."1 37 Given the
Court's reversion to Northern Pacifc's standard that a per se analysis
applies only if the challenged practice has a "pernicious effect on
competition" and is without "any redeeming virtue,"138 the Court's
decision raised the question whether the Court would in the future
apply its neoclassical economics to vertical price fixing cases. Argua-
bly, resale price maintenance might have some "redeeming virtue" in
promoting competition in the interbrand market by addressing the
free rider problem.1 39 Moreover, since the Court in Sylvania held that
the ancient rule against restraint on alienation did not justify theper
se approach in a nonprice vertical restraint, 14 it was conceivable
that the Court would turn to a Sylvania-like analysis. 14 Sylvania's
analysis inadequately justified its disparate treatment of price and
nonprice restraints so as to question the analytical distinction's con-
tinued vitality. 142
Justice Powell, who authored the Sylvania decision, addressed
the analytical uncertainty three years later in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Assoc. v. Mdcal Aluminum, Inc. 143 Plaintiffs in Midcal chal-
lenged California's wine pricing scheme as a classic resale price main-
tenance arrangement under the Sherman Act. By state regulation,
wine prices set by a single wholesaler within a particular trading area
136 I at 51 n.18, 58-59.
137 Id at 51 n.18.
138 Id at 50.
139 See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 288-91 (1978); Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Prce Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. I (1978); Posner,
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Refections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1977); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications ofthe
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979).
140 433 U.S. at 57.
141 Earlier resale price maintenance cases justified the per se analysis on the common law
rationale of restraint on alienation. See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S.
476,487 (1926); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,404 (1911). Cf Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
142 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. In Schwinn, the Court also stated that where price fixing is impli-
cated in the distributional system, the restriction is per se illegal. 388 U.S. at 375-76.
143 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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bound all wholesalers in that trade zone. 144 The state alcoholic bev-
erage commission imposed sanctions for selling, below the posted
price.
Unfortunately, Justice Powell's opinion in Midcal failed to con-
front the analytical conflict created in Sylvania between price and
nonprice vertical restraints. Justice Powell continued to discuss the
restraint in terms of "control" rather then competitive effect. The
Court merely reaffirmed precedent, holding that vertical price re-
straints were as pernicious as horizontal price agreements and there-
fore merited only a per se examination to determine whether the
practice existed.
145
The earlier decisional law concerning resale price restraints was
set forth principally by Justice Hughes in Dr Miles Medical Co. v. John
P. Park & Sons Co. ,' where the Court relied on the property rule
prohibiting restraints on alienation to find a resale price restraint
conclusively illegal. This cursory analysis applied as long as the man-
ufacturer had relinquished dominion and title to the product. The
Court expressed concern for protecting freedom of trade for in-
dependent dealers "who own what they sell.' 47 Justice Hughes rea-
soned that the per se analysis should be applied to vertical price
arrangements imposed by manufacturers because such restrictions
have the same competitive impact as horizontal price fixing agree-
ments between wholesalers or dealers.' 48 The facts of the case, how-
ever, presented no evidence of wholesaler or dealer cartelization.
The Court did not address whether a decrease in price competition
caused an increase in nonprice competition, and did not discuss the
resultant competitive effect on the market. 
49
Justice Powell's opinion in Midcal followed the Dr. Miles narrow
144 Id at 99-100.
145 Id at 102-03.
146 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
147 Id at 407-08.
148 Id at 408.
149 In 1937, largely in reaction to Dr. Miles, Congress permitted states to authorize resale
price maintenance to insulate small business from price and marketing practices of large con-
cerns who might be in a position, due to marketing economies, to offer their products at
discount. Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Amendment, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). If minimum retail prices could be set, small retail establish-
ments might not be driven from the market. Dr. Miles was therefore suspended in those states
that adopted fair trade laws. The suspension lasted almost forty years. In 1975, Congress,
dissatisfied with the competitive effects of the state fair trade laws, repealed its 1937 approval
of the fair trade legislation. Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 45). As a result, vertical
price restrictions again came within Dr. Miles's reach.
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approach and failed ultimately for not recognizing that Sylvania's
economic syllogism had undercut Dr. Miles's rationale. Although an
analytical distinction should perhaps remain between price and non-
price vertical restraints, the Court has not to date set forth an ade-
quate justification for the distinction.
The present Court's single legal justification for applying theper
se analysis to resale price maintenance agreements is that Congress
implicitly "expressed its approval of a per se analysis" when it re-
scinded the authority for state fair trade laws. 150 The Court can be
faulted for failing to articulate how its conclusion that only a per se
analysis should be employed in vertical price restriction cases can be
reconciled with the economic theory advanced in Sylvania. By re-
stricting its decisional process to this limited focus, lower courts will
be unable to explore whether in a particular situation the vertical
price restraint promotes interbrand competition or whether it fur-
thers horizontal cartelization. The particular utility of the commer-
cial practice will never be evaluated. Moreover, the Burger Court
has failed to reformulate how nonprice restraints that may have an
effect on price will be analyzed. The Court has left unresolved
whether nonprice restraints should be weighed under Sylvania's new
economics or treated under Midcal's and Dr. Miles's theory that verti-
cal restrictions may be as effective in producing anticompetitive con-
sequences as horizontal price agreements. 151
The Court's rigid decisionmaking style, which precludes weigh-
ing actual economic or social effects, will certainly make the judicial
process less complicated and will reduce transaction costs. As a result
of the increasingly mechanistic decisionmaking, policies, interests,
and experiences in a particular industry will be ignored.
52
150 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). See also
California Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980).
151 445 U.S. at 102; 220 U.S. at 408. See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S.
643 (1980).
152 The present antitrust enforcement officials have announced that they will urge the
Burger Court to apply its analytical refinement introduced in Sylvania to resale price mainte-
nance agreements as well as nonprice restraints. They argue that vertical practices by defini-
tion are incapable of affecting interbrand competition. Statement by Melanie Cutler,
Twenty-First Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar On Distribution and Marketing, in New
York City (Dec. 8, 1981). The economic justification for the broader analysis follows:
Unless all the manufacturers in the relevant product market are also imposing
RPM, the manufacturer's objective cannot be to foster collusion with his competi-
tors. Moreover, since we are assuming the manufacturer has decided it is in his




Besides distributional restrictions, another related vertical re-
straint occurs where the manufacturer sells a desired product only on
the condition that the purchaser take a second, perhaps less desira-
ble, product.153 If the purchaser wants the first product, it will have
to take the second product even though it may be under less competi-
tive terms. The tying arrangement has antitrust implications not
only because it limits the purchaser's freedom to deal but also be-
cause it may foreclose competition in the second (tied) product
market. 154
Since Sylvania, economic theories have been advanced which ar-
gue that tying arrangements should be treated like other nonprice
vertical restraints, because under certain circumstances they can
achieve cost savings and enhance efficiency.155 Neither the Burger
Court nor its predecessor has accepted these arguments, though the
Burger Court's analysis of tying arrangements has shown change in
direction.
The Warren Court applied a strict analytical approach to verti-
cal tying arrangements. Because the Warren Court considered tying
(That would only raise price, hence reduce sales, to consumers, and would hurt the
manufacturer as much as it hurts consumers.)
[T]he likely explanation for the use of RPM . . . is to encourage dealers to
provide the pre-sale demonstrations, information and advertising- as well as post-
sale servicing - necessary to the proper functioning of his product. If dealers are
able to cut prices by not providing those services, consumers will get quite a differ-
ent (and, quite likely, less satisfactory) product . . . . [T]he consumer buys the
product from a discounter, misuses it, the product malfunctions and the consumer
concludes that the product was badly manufactured. The producer's reputation
and sales plummet. Those dealers who were willing to provide the needed services
will not long do so because they are losing sales to the discounters - and may even
find themselves spending money to provide those services on goods they didn't sell.
The producer's distribution network falls apart.
Id
This economic logic has been challenged recently on the "competitive-advantage" theory
that resale price maintenance should continue to be distinguished from nonprice vertical re-
straints because the dealer-service theory does not adequately explain vertical price arrange-
ments and because retail price maintenance does not resolve the free rider problem. See
Gerhart, The "Compietiive Advantages" Explanationfor Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analsis,
1981 DUKE L.J. 417.
153 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
154 370 U.S. at 330; 356 U.S. at 5-6. The underlying theory is that the seller will use its
market power in the tying product as a lever to increase unfairly sales in the tied product.
155 See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COOR-
DINATION AND CONTROL 345-47 (2d ed. 1977); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
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arrangements inherently anticompetitive, it applied the self limited
per se analysis to vertical tying arrangements. 5 6 The Supreme Court
made it clear in Northern Paqft Railway v. United States that the per se
decisionmaking style obviated an "elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm .. .caused or the business excuse . . .[or] a prolonged eco-
nomic investigation into the entire history of the industry in-
volved."' 157 This conclusion rested on prior decisions and the
intuitive assumption that tying arrangements were perniciously an-
ticompetitive. 58 The Court refused to consider and weigh any
procompetitive features that the practice had in a particular market,
even though it held in Northern Pacfic that the policy underlying the
Sherman Act was advancement of competition. If evidence was in-
troduced that the manufacturer had sufficient economic power in the
tying product to restrain competition in the tied product market and
a substantial amount of commerce was affected, the inquiry ended.
The per se classification precluded the decisional process from weigh-
ing the economic or social interests that were relevant to the chal-
lenged conduct. 1
59
Before the Burger Court's analytical shift in United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,'60 the Supreme Court frequently inferred
the requisite power in the tying product if the arrangement affected a
not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product. 161
156 Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner I); United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
157 356 U.S. at 5.
158 See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
159 On at least two occasions the Court had made exceptions to its strictper se analysis.
FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (not an unfair practice under § 5 of the
FTC Act for oil companies to lease underground tanks with pumps imprinted with its trade-
mark to retail dealers upon the condition that the leased products be used only with gasoline
supplied by the lessor, because the Court valued the "goodwill" defense that consumers would
be misled and supplier's goodwill adversely affected if gas refined by other oil companies was
supplied from its pumps); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afd per cunam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (where the tied product was found to be closely
integrated with the tying product, the Court permitted the defendant to raise its goodwill as a
defense out of fear that it may be damaged if other manufacturers' products were used in-
stead). But cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (violation of
federal antitrust laws for owner of patents on machines using salt to lease the machines sub-
ject to condition that salt be purchased from lessor); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S.
131 (1936) (condition in lease requiring lessee to operate leased machinery only with supplies
from lessor violates § 3 of Clayton Act).
160 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II).
161 See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); International Salt Co. v. United
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This inferential leap permitted the Court to apply its cursory analysis
in finding the tying arrangement illegal. In Fortner II, the Burger
Court signaled that it was not predisposed to rely on such an infer-
ence to establish per se illegality.162 Consequently, plaintiffs now face
far greater difficulty in invoking theper se analysis in cases involving
tying arrangements.
Fortner II moved sharply away from the Warren' Court's rigid
summary analysis. Although the per se standard still remains after
Fortner II, the Court now requires a greater evidentiary showing of
market power in the tying product before applying theperse analysis.
Absent rather explicit evidence of actual market power, the Court
will examine the tying arrangement under the broader rule of reason
approach. Under this analytical process, the Court will be more in-
clined to measure the restraint's severity against cost efficiencies.'
63
In light of the economic framework of Sylvania and Forther II, the
Burger Court seems ready to apply a more consistent and broader
based analysis for nonprice tying arrangements, and will consider
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545
(E.D. Pa. 1960), aJf'dper curam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
162 Plaintiff in the Fortner cases was a residential property developer who accepted an offer
from U.S. Steel to purchase prefabricated houses at below market interest rates. Thereafter
Fortner sued U.S. Steel on the theory that U.S. Steel had tied the sale of the prefabricated
houses (tied product) to the low interest line of credit (tying product). In FortnerI the Warren
Court reversed the lower courts because it held thaf plaintiff had satisfied the second prong of
the test-that a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the prefabricated housing market
had been affected by the transaction-and that plaintiff should be permitted to demonstrate
whether U.S. Steel had "appreciable economic power" in the credit (tying product) market.
On remand the lower court found the requisite market power under the standard set
forth by the Warren Court. Plaintiff charged only aper se violation and did not on remand
pursue the case under the rule of reason standard. 429 U.S. at 610-11. In Fortner II, decided
eight years later, the Burger Court reversed without dissent. The Court reasoned that in
order for the plaintiff to come within theper se analysis it had to demonstrate that U.S. Steel
had market power, either by showing that the company enjoyed some cost advantage over
other competitors in the credit market or that its tying product (credit terms) was unique.
Uniqueness was not defined by the fact that the credit was the most advantageous in the
market. In other words, the Court would not infer market power simply because the financ-
ing terms were unusual, since they may also reflect that U.S. Steel was willing to take greater
risks or less profit. Id at 621-22. Moreover, the mere existence of a substantial number of
transactions involving the tie did not prove power in the tying product because this might
have been due to the advantageous credit terms. Id at 618 & n.10.
163 The Court has utilized an efficiency analysis irregularly in tie-in cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I
(1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afdper
curtam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
[Vol. 58:1]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
and weigh the actual competitive harm in the particular market.
The precise boundaries of analysis remain to be seen. If the Court
chooses to apply the noneconomic factors noted in Sylvania,164 the
defenses of product quality and goodwill may yet find acceptance
and take on added analytical importance.
3. Mergers
Although amended several times, section seven of the Clayton
Act 165 remains the standard under which mergers are judged. The
statute proscribes mergers or acquisitions, whether categorized as
horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, that threaten to significantly
impair or lessen competition in a defined market. The Warren Court
applied the Clayton Act standard strictly and often mechanistically,
as its analyses focused on industrial structure and concentration
data. 66 While the Burger Court's jurisprudential style toward merg-
ers has not yet fully emerged, certain analytical distinctions are
evident.
The Warren Court's structural-based analysis in merger cases
confirmed its realist use of empirical economic data. The Court's
doctrinal analysis also exhibited its value-implicit normative direc-
tion toward promoting competition equality. In the early case of
United States v. EL DuPont de Nemours & Co. ,167 Justice Brennan ob-
served that the statute was "designed to arrest in its incipiency not
only the substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition by
one corporation of the whole or any part of the stock of a competing
corporation, but also to arrest in their incipiency restraints or monop-
olies in a relevant market."'168 Under the DuPont analysis, section
seven of the Clayton Act set a standard of reasonable probability-a
164 433 U.S. at 55 n.23.
165 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Seegeneral'y P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1980);
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 198-262 (1978); J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE EN-
TERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1973); J. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY, 1895-1956 (1959); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 81-150, 544-63 (1st ed. 1970). For pre-Clayton Act merger cases, see United
States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908); Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906); Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
166 The advent of this structural approach was presaged in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
167 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
168 Id at 589. The Court stated that "incipiency" denotes "any time when the acquisition
threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect." Id at 597. Substantiality was to "be determined
only in terms of the market affected." Id at 593.
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less rigorous standard than the Sherman Act. Mergers were forbid-
den when the trend toward concentration was still in its incipiency,
and an actual restraint was not necessary.
The Court's seminal merger case is Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,169 where the Court fully embraced a Brandeisian multi-fac-
eted analysis designed to further industry deconcentration, disperse
economic power, and protect small business. Chief Justice Warren
interpreted the legislative history of section seven to mandate a nor-
mative decisional approach:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration ...
was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration in the American economy. . . .Other considerations
...were the desirability of retaining 'local control' over industry
and the protection of small businesses.1 70
The Court suggested a multifaceted analysis to promote compe-
tition that included weighing a broad range of quantitative economic
factors: market share data, concentration data, market and industry
trends, and entry barrier evidence.t17  Although the Court's decision
to uphold a violation seemed to turn on concentration data, 72 the
Court provided little direction or guidance to the lower courts in de-
termining what weight each factor merited.
The wide-open balancing analysis advanced by Brown Shoe
seemed undercut the following year when the Court in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank 73 announced a presumptive illegality test.
The Court in Philadelphia National. Bank held that the merger is pre-
sumed illegal if as a result, one firm controls an "undue market share
percentage" and market concentration significantly increases.1 74 The
Court's analysis emphasized the market share factor. The Court
noted that its decisional process need not entertain "elaborate proof
of market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive
169 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The normative underpinnings of Brown Shoe, like those espoused
earlier by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade, found expression in the Court's conclu-
sion that § 7, in order to protect small competitors, did not proscribe small firms from merg-
ing so that they could better compete against larger competitors. Id at 319.
170 Id at 315-16 (footnotes omitted). See Hearings on S. 698 Before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1147 (1914).
171 370 U.S. at 321-22.
172 Id at 346. See Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J. LAw & ECON. 81 (1975).
173 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
174 Id at 363. The challenged merger had a resulting market share of 30%; the merger
was deemed violative of § 7.
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effects. ' 175 Although the Court did not define "undue," it required
no weighing analysis because the acquisition was inherently suspect if
the merger resulted in an undue market share. The Court cautioned
that a merger resulting in less than a thirty percent market share
might also raise an inference of illegality.
176
Philadelphia National Bank's prima. facie test seems inconsistent
with the broader market factor analysis of Brown Shoe. Although the
Court's analysis in Philadelphia National Bank is highly simplified be-
cause the Court does not weigh economic impact or policies, the
analysis is not conclusive. The Court indicated it would permit evi-
dence that the merger was not anticompetitive, but the available de-
fenses were not evident. The Warren Court rejected enhanced
efficiencies, ease of market entry, scale economies, and increased
competition in other markets as relevant factors to be weighed.
177 It
appeared to sanction the "failing company" doctrine as the only
defense. '
78
The Court's normative methodology is also evidenced by its
preference for industrial growth by internal de novo expansion over
growth by acquisition. Without elaborate discussion or citation, the
Court commented that "surely one premise of an antimerger statute
such as § 7 is that corporate growth by internal expansion is socially
preferable to growth by acquisition,"'' 79 even though the latter might
be more cost efficient and enhance competition. Thus, the Court im-
plicitly subordinated the goal of economic efficiency to other values.
Subsequent Warren Court cases confirm the Court's jurispru-
dential predilection towards doctrinal structuralism as the basis for
its populist protection of small business. In Von-s Groceg, the Court
175 Id The presumptive illegality test arguably has application only to a concentrated
market. Otherwise the broader Brown Shoe balancing approach would be operative.
176 374 U.S. at 364.
177 Id at 370-71. Although unclear, the Court implied that the "failing-company" doc-
trine or insolvency might be the only defense available to rebut the presumption. See United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,507 (1974); United States v. Greater Buffalo
Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
136-37 (1969); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 299-303 (1930); S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
178 See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States
v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962); International Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Hearings on the Failing Company Defense Before Suhcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on thejudicia,7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 165, at 100-46; E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE
LAW OF MERGERS 262-70 (1973); Laurenza, Section 7of the Clayton Act and the Failing Company.-
An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REV. 947 (1979).
179 374 U.S. at 370.
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reasoned that in order "to arrest this 'rising ride' toward concentra-
tion into too few hands and to halt the gradual demise of the small
businessman, ''1 ° it was necessary to define the markets narrowly
and to rely primarily on only small increases in market shares of the
merging firms. 81 In neither case did the Court attempt, in the words
of Justice Stewart, "to appraise the competitive effects of. . . [the]
acquisition"'18 2 under the broad economic functional analysis of
Brown Shoe or under any other analysis that qualitatively weighed
interests or policies other than the protection of small competitors.
More recently, the Burger Court has rejected the Warren
180 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966).
181 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Gro-
cery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 377 U.S. 271 (1964). See also United
States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorp.,
418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350
(1970).
182 384 U.S. at 282 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I believe that even the most superficial analysis of the record makes plain the
fallacy of the Court's syllogism that competition is necessarily reduced when the
bare number of competitors has declined. In any meaningful sense, the structure of
the Los Angeles grocery market remains unthreatened by concentration. Local
competition is vigorous to a fault, not only among chain stores themselves but also
between chain stores and single-store operators. The continuing population explo-
sion of the Los Angeles area, which has outrun the expansion plans of even the
largest chains, offers a surfeit of business opportunity for stores of all sizes. Affili-
ated with cooperatives that give the smallest store the buying strength of its largest
competitor, new stores have taken full advantage of the remarkable ease of entry
into the market. And, most important of all, the record simply cries out that the
numerical decline in the number of single-store owners is the result of transcending
social and technological changes that positively preclude the inference that compe-
tition has suffered because of the attrition of competitors.
Section 7 was never intended by Congress for use by the Court as a charter to
roll back the supermarket revolution. Yet the Court's opinion is hardly more than
a requiem for the so-called "Mom and Pop" grocery stores-the bakery and butch-
er shops, the vegetable and fish markets-that are now economically and techno-
logically obsolete in many parts of the country. No action by this Court can
resurrect the old single-line Los Angeles food stores that have been run over by the
automobile or obliterated by the freeway. The transformation of American society
since the Second World War has not completely shelved these specialty stores, but
it has relegated them to a much less central role in our food economy. Today's
dominant enterprise in food retailing is the supermarket. Accessible to the house-
wife's automobile from a wide radius, it houses under a single roof the entire food
requirements of the family. Only through the sort of reactionary philosophy that
this Court long ago rejected in the Due Process Clause area can the Court read into
the legislative history of § 7 its attempt to make the automobile stand still, to mold
the food economy of today into the market pattern of another era.
Id at 287-89 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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Court's rather mechanical jural analysis and, while not yet fully de-
veloped has introduced a decisional approach to merger law that at-
tempts to examine a broader array of factors relevant to the merger's
probable competitive effects. In United States v. General Dynamics
Corp. ,183 the Court entertained an analysis that went beyond the
structuralism of market share data and concentration ratios to deter-
mine whether inferences of merger illegality were rebutted. While
the narrow Philadelphia National Bank streamlined analysis remained
applicable, the Court in General Dynamics broadened its approach to
consider other market factors which may be more relevant in predict-
ing future market conditions and behavior in a particular market.
Specifically, the Court in General Dynamics held that post-acquisi-
tion evidence of reserve capacity, rather than market share data, was
the most relevant economic data in determining future competitive
effect in the coal market.18 4 In drawing this conclusion, the Court's
analysis focused on market conditions other than share data and con-
centration evidence. The Court importantly considered that the ac-
quired firm's market percentage represented current deliveries on
contracts entered into many years before, that the acquired firm had
few uncommitted coal reserves for current or future contract oppor-
tunities, and that the firm's future competitive prospects were "un-
promising."'' 85 Together the Court accepted these market factors as
rebuttal evidence of the firm's market position.
In sum, Justice Stewart's majority opinion 8 6 in General Dynamics
implicitly suggests a return to Brown Shoe's broader-based merger
analysis. The Court's open-ended functional analysis weighs indus-
try structure, history, competitive conditions, and probable future
market effects,' 8 7 after a full economic and factual investigation.
Factors bearing on actual competitive and legal' 88 capacity, rather
than mere sales data, are central to the predictive function of the
analysis. Sales data, however, has not become irrelevant. General
Dynamics indicates clearly that undue market shares can still raise the
presumption of illegality. 89 The distinction lies in the Burger
183 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See also, United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86
(1975); United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
184 415 U.S. at 510-11.
185 Id at 500-02.
186 It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart was a frequent, vocal critic of the Warren
Court's antitrust jurisprudence.
187 415 U.S. at 498.
188 See United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
189 See RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9ih Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
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Court's greater receptivity to a wider range of competitive criteria
leading to a more broadly-based analytical style. 90 In addition, the
Burger Court's analysis portends that it values the protection of com-
petition rather than competitors as the primary goal of antitrust. 19'
This trend suggests new defense avenues beyond the failing company
doctrine, particularly when structural market share data overstate
competitive significance.
General Dynamics does not resolve whether the Burger Court's ep-
ochal analytical changes regarding efficiency objectives in decision-
making under section one of the Sherman Act apply under section
seven of the Clayton Act. While General DIynamics indicates that the
Court will employ economic evidence as a decisionmaking tool in
determining market competitiveness, it did not signal that the Court
is prepared to embrace, as it has in other textual contexts, efficiency
standards as an analytical model under section seven. 92 Whether
the balancing framework advanced to date is broad enough to in-
clude the defense that the challenged expansion through acquisition
would promote competition in the merged firm's market remains un-
clear. Expansion through acquisition arguably can increase effi-
ciency by reducing plant size and capital costs to result in lower
prices, thus promoting competition and consumer welfare. 93 These
economic rationales are consistent with the goals of antitrust policy
espoused in Professional Engineers, Broadcast Musicj and Sylvania.
In certain important respects, the economic rationales suggested
in General Dynamics are inconsistent with the social and political val-
ues articulated in Brown Shoe.' 94 If the Court views the preservation
and stabilization of small competitors as the underlying political or
190 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977) (market
share data rebutted by evidence that the acquired firm was not an effective competitor be-
cause of insufficient financing). See also FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Fortner
II further evidences that the present Court is not inclined to infer market power from market
share data and might be cited in the §§ 2 and 7 context that actual power must be
established.
191 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); but see New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 133 & n.25 (1978).
192 See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). While internally in-
consistent, the Court in Brown Shoe also implied that it would consider efficiency as an analyti-
cal measure in evaluating a merger between small companies. 370 U.S. at 319.
193 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
194 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); Bok,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 -ARV. L. REv. 226, 236-37
(1960). Compare the internal inconsistency in Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 319-20, 344.
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social value of section seven, as did the Warren Court, then the use of
a positive efficiencies analysis in assessing mergers will surely wane.
However, since the Burger Court has recently declared that "anti-
trust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any ob-
jective benchmarks,"' 195 the Court will likely recognize that other
structural factors and efficiency criteria serve as useful analytical
measures of competitive probabilities.1 96 Current merger enforce-
ment policies emphasize whether there is an actual or significant
competitive threat at the horizontal level of competition. As a result,
mergers classified as vertical or conglomerate1 97 no longer receive
195 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
196 See generaly 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, srupra note 165, at 1-206. This approach
would seem clearly incompatible with the Warren Court's philosophy noted in FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967), where the Court stated that "[p]ossible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers
which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of
protecting competition."
197 The decisions frequently indicate that the traditional merger categorization into verti-
cal, horizontal, or conglomerate mergers does not help the analysis. FTC v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The judicial analysis has often touched on whether the merger
has "lessened competition" by reason of foreclosing competition, squeezing price and supply,
or increasing entry barriers. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 249 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afdpercuriam,
381 U.S. 414 (1965); United States v. Alcoa, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aJfd per
curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965). Even in the vertical merger context, the trends in the decisional
law and lack of significant cases since the early 1970's suggest that the courts are less inclined
to interpret § 7 in a strictly structural market analysis to determine whether there has been a
market foreclosure. Indeed, analysts have questioned whether vertical integration by merger
should be treated differently than vertical integration by internal expansion and whether the
judicial analysis should weigh substantial efficiencies as a defense. R. POSNER & F. EASTER-
BROOK, ANTTRUST 861, 869-76 (1980). See also 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 165,
at 211-15. In recent years, challenges to conglomerate mergers have invoked heated debate.
Much of the enforcement effort directed against such mergers arises from the normative ideal
that small business should be preferred over expanding asset acquisition, which concentrates
economic and political power in the hands of few organizations. See note 169 upra. Jural
analyses of such mergers have included the following theories: that the merger leads to recip-
rocal dealing where a buyer uses its purchasing power as leverage to force suppliers to deal
with products or services that it or its subsidiaries deal in; that the merger by a large acquir-
ing firm over a dominant member of another concentrated market will entrench further the
dominant acquired firm; and that the merger will lead to loss of potential competition. For a
general discussion of the reciprocity theory, see FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S.
592 (1965); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1963); United States v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,393 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), afd per curiam, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. ITT, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,619 (N.D. Il1. 1971); United States v.
ITT, 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp.
1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. Pencik & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
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major antitrust scrutiny unless they eliminate potential competition
For a general discussion of the entrenchment theory, see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); United States
v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,393 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'dper
cu'am, 1978-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,063 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). For a general discussion of the alternative
potential competitor theories, see United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964); BOG Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
These merger cases evidence a decisional analysis that is less favorable to the Jeffersonian
value of stabilization of the small competitor and more favorable to the emerging concern for
positive use of economies and efficiencies. For example, the Warren Court's analysis in Procter
& Gamble focused on structural evidence regarding entry barriers and the entrenchment effect
that the merger allegedly would produce. Implicit in the Court's analysis is the notion that
mergers increase barriers to entry for new competition and produce increased likelihood for
oligopoly pricing and predatory pricing. Moreover, the Court disapproved of a balancing
analysis which weighed economies. 386 U.S. at 580. It reasoned that Congress, in adopting
the legislative framework, had already "struck the balance" against the positive use of an
efficiency analysis. Id Justice Harlan disagreed. In conglomerate mergers, he argued that
the Court should entertain a "full investigation and analysis, whatever the cost in delay or
immediate effectiveness." Id at 590 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Edwards, Test of Probable
E feet Under the Clayton Act, 9 ANTrrRUST BULL. 369, 377 (1964). Justice Harlan urged that
economic theory can inform antitrust decisionmaking and opined that operational efficiencies
were some of the reasons Congress favored competition. "[A] firm's ability to achieve econo-
mies enhances its competitive position. . . ." 386 U.S. at 597 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"[W]hen the case against a conglomerate or product-extension merger rests on a market-
structure demonstration that the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences has been sub-
stantially increased, [the analysis] should then move on to examine and weigh possible effi-
ciencies arising from the merger in order to determine whether, on balance, competition has
been substantially lessened" through "countervailing economies." Id at 598-99 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan concluded by observing that the Court should recognize substan-
tial economies as a defense where they promote competition in production, distribution, mar-
keting or advertising. Id at 599-604 (Harlan, J., concurring). His analysis anticipated the
broader use of a more wide-open merger analysis and less emphasis on rigid decisionmaking
rules. A majority of the Court, however, was unprepared to accept the broader based balanc-
ing approach until 1974. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 570 (1972) ("A
merger is not saved from illegality . . . 'because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude
is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us
already [by Congress].' "); see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,540-
43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in part) ("[T]he desirability of retaining 'local control' over
industry and the protection of small businesses. . . [was] one of the purposes of strengthening
§ 7. .. . By reason of the antitrust laws, efficiency in terms of the accounting of dollar costs
and profits is not the measure of the public interest nor is growth in size where no substantial
competition is curtailed."). But see 405 U.S. at 586-87 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
Beginning with General Dynamics in 1974, the Court accepted a more wide-open realist
analysis for challenges to conglomerate and market extension mergers. In United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the Burger Court rejected the rigid structural
analysis advanced earlier and accepted a weighing analysis for determining the viability of
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or evidence a rather direct "horizontal overlap between parties to the
transaction." 98
Section seven should be able to recognize and accommodate the
widest range of normative options, including economic analysis as
well as socio-political considerations. Otherwise, the legal analysis in
the realist tradition will be unable to reconcile on a case-by-case basis
the competing pluralistic demands on the economy. This broader-
based ad hoc balancing analysis will increase the process costs of
decisionmaking.199 However, rigid analytical rules deny the benefits
of a careful case-by-case balancing process that weighs current but
often changing competitive and socio-political values, policies, and
experience. The benefits of a more rational, and less mechanical, an-
titrust jurisprudence are qualitatively obvious.
200
Recently, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division reconsid-
ered the Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines. The new 1982 revi-
sion introduces significant changes. 201 Foremost among the changes
is the desire that the analytical framework for evaluating mergers
include broader bases of inquiry than the Warren Court's analytical
approach. While a structural analysis remains central to the evalua-
the potential competition doctrine. Thus, in each subsequent market extension merger, the
Court will consider whether the concentration statistics are the most relevant competitive
factors of market behavior, and will balance structural data against other economic evidence
of future competitive ability. Economic evidence that may be relevant in the decisional ap-
proach includes: ease of entry into the market, market trends away from competition, contin-
uation of price competition, financial weakness of the merged firm, competitive market
weakness of both firms, and actual independence of the merged firm after the acquisition. See,
e.g., Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 653 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. international Harvester Co.,
564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977); BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105
(D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See generaly 5 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 165, at 1-293.
198 Proposed Purchase of Marathon Oil Company by Mobil Oil Corp.: Joint Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General).
199 The Burger Court has implicitly recognized that economic and statistical evidence can
drive the process cost of litigation so high that the cost outweighs the value of the analysis.
See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., [Jan.-June] ANTrrRUST AND TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) F-I, F-3 (U.S. May 26, 1981); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
200 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 165; see also Williamson, Economies AsAn Antitrust
Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Williamson, Economies As An Antitrust Defense.-
The Welfare Tradeoifs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
201 Merger Guidelines of Department ofJustice-1982, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4501-4504
(June 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Guidelines].
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tive process, the Guidelines indicate that nonmarket share data will
also play a role in the process. A more detailed economic and factual
examination of the facts seems apparent, and market intervention
may be less frequent.
The Guidelines state that they represent enforcement policy re-
garding merger conduct under both section seven of the Clayton Act
and section one of the Sherman Act.2 0 2 This may portend that merg-
ers or acquisitions henceforth will be challenged only where the re-
straint is actual rather than threatened or incipient. More reliance
may be placed on determining competitive significance in section one
cases than in section seven cases.20 3 The underlying rationale of the
new Guidelines centers on countering mergers that may facilitate
cartel behavior. Through a price theory orientation, the Guidelines
will attempt to identify mergers that will increase market power and
the likelihood of cartelization.2 0 4 The new Guidelines reject the 1968
Guidelines' approach to vertical and conglomerate mergers, and use
price and supply factors and concentration data to predict cartel
behavior.
2 0 5
In order to evaluate market concentration and market power,
the product and geographic market must be defined. The new
Guidelines, grounded in the economic policy of price theory, intro-
duce new market definition standards which require evaluations of
price and supply factors.206 The cross elasticity between products in
response to price changes, including the ability to interchange or sub-
stitute products, is a key factor in defining the product market. Cross
elasticity will be measured according to how. a one year, five percent
price increase in the relevant product affects product substitution.2 0 7
This standard of responsiveness, which seeks to measure the number
of actual and potential sellers in the market by the effect of a price
increase, will undoubtedly be difficult to measure empirically or
otherwise. By defining the market in terms of sellers who compete or
potentially could compete with the merging firm, the new Guidelines
dilute the merging firm's market share from the corresponding calcu-
lation under the 1968 Guidelines, which included only market share
202 Id at 4501.
203 See, e.g., Panel Discussion with William F Baxter, Assistant Allorney General Antitrust Divi-
sion, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 151, 158-59 (1981).
204 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 201, at 4501.
205 See id. at 4501-4504.203.
206 Id at 1 4502-4502.40.
207 Id
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data for current producers (sellers).208 The new Guidelines' utility in
promoting certain or predictable results is questionable. The Guide-
lines' method of identifying relevant sellers in the market in order to
then consider concentration factors and market power, while perhaps
economically rational, may be unworkable.
Once the market is defined, the analytical process under the
Guidelines seeks to determine whether the merger is likely to facili-
tate collusive exercise of market power. 20 9 Concentration evidence
remains highly relevant in identifying market power that might lead
to cartel behavior. The new Guidelines, however, employ a new
standard in predicting concentration problems, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).210 This change from the four-firm concen-
tration standard utilized in the 1968 Guidelines21 does not expressly
focus on prohibiting mergers in industries that exhibit increased con-
centration trends over time; only market share data at given times
(pre- and post-merger levels) are scrutinized to determine concentra-
tion and market power significance. 21 2 Use of the HHI to measure
concentration and to assess probability of collusion will likely in-
crease the permissible size of market shares that may be combined
through a merger.
In at least one important respect, the new Guidelines do not al-
ter the 1968 Guidelines' rejection of efficiency-based defenses as a
justification for the merger. Since the 1968 Guidelines were issued,
analysts have frequently discussed whether a merger that produced
economies through increased efficiency in the market should be sanc-
tioned.2 13 The viability of efficiency-based defenses requires inquiry
into whether the economies can be measured and, if so, whether cost
savings produced by expansion through acquisition will in the long
run offset the advantages of internal expansion. While the new
Guidelines state that an efficiency defense will not mitigate an other-
wise challengable merger except in extraordinary cases,214 the Guide-
208 See Merger Guidelines of Dept. ofJustice-1968, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 [here-
inafter cited as 1968 Guidelines].
209 1982 Guidelines, supra note 201, at 4501.
210 Id at 4503.10.
211 1968 Guidelines, supra note 208, at 4510.
212 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 201, at 4503.101. The change from the 1968 Guide-
lines' four-firm concentration standard represents a major shift from previous law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
213 Compare Williamson, Economies As An Antitrust Defense Revzsdted, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699
(1977), and Williamson, Economies As An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeojs, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 18 (1968), with R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST, 463-64, 920-21 (1981).
214 See 1982 Guidelines, supra note 201, at 4505.10.
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lines identify a larger array of factors in addition to market share
data that will be considered. Included economic and non-economic
conduct factors in the merger analysis are: 1) the ease of market en-
try, 2) the nature of the product (i.e. homogeneity), 3) the terms of
the sale, 4) the availability of market information about specific
transactions, 5) the existence of prior horizontal collusion among
firms in the market, and 6) the prevalence of industry-wide trade
practices (i.e. mandatory delivered pricing, exchange of price or out-
put information, or standardization or price ,protection clauses) .215
Each, apparently, serves to evaluate market power and the potential-
ity of horizontal collusion and eventual cartelization. The weight as-
signed to these individual nonmarket share factors and their utility
relative to the HHI's individual concentration classifications is
unclear.
Since the Supreme Court is not bound to follow the new Guide-
lines, predicting how the Court will receive the new analytical stan-
dards is difficult. While the Guidelines' continued emphasis on
structural data such as market share is contrary to General Dynamics,
the Court has rather consistently embraced economic-based evidence
as a rationale for antitrust decisionmaking. To the extent that the
new Guidelines continue the trend of analyzing market conduct
through a greater array of competitive criteria, the Guidelines seem
at least partially compatible with current judicial trends, but con-
trary to the Warren Court's interpretation of section seven. If used as
litigation standards, the Guidelines will greatly increase the transac-
tion costs of litigation and significantly alter the decisional process in
section seven cases.
4. Monopolization
The Burger Court's unwillingness to review a section two mo-
nopolization case illustrates the Court's judicial restraint. The last
major section two cases decided by the Supreme Court came down in
1966-67,216 well within the Warren Court era. Circuit court deci-
sions217 largely govern the law's interpretation in monopolization
215 1982 Guidelines, suupra note 201, at 4503.20 - 4503.304.
216 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
217 See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. A.T. & T. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981),cert. denied,
452 U.S. 917 (1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1708 (1982); California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.s. 1093 (1980); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d
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cases today. For this reason, discussions regarding the present
Supreme Court's jurisprudential approach under section two of the
Sherman Act must be tentative. Comparisons between Warren
Court precedents and present lower court trends, however, may help
predict the Court's future analysis.
From its early origins, decisional law has viewed section two
from. a behavioral and structuralist perspective. Courts have used
market structure and power, together with conduct, as analytical
measures for predicting or confirming a firm's performance. Since
courts have not interpreted section two to condemn the mere posses-
sion of market power,218 the decisional process turns on the relation-
ship between a firm's market power and its conduct.2 19 Throughout
the years of antitrust litigation, courts with changing philosophies
have analyzed that relationship differently.
Early decisions evidenced the Court's willingness to weigh
whether the business conduct was reasonable under the circum-
stances of the firm's market power.220 The Court provided no abso-
lute proscriptions nor exact analyses to guide lower courts. Once
monopoly power had been demonstrated, the challenged conduct
was to be weighed against "normal" methods of industrial develop-
ment.22 ' The analysis essentially centered on the nature of the be-
havior and its closeness to and effect on market power. To be illegal,
the conduct had to be similar to conduct condemned under section
one as a restraint of trade. From such conduct, the Court inferred
the re'quisite illegal intent. Conduct short of that recognized as re-
straint under section one was presumably lawful.
The Supreme Court's strict interpretation of section two's mo-
nopolization test was challenged in 1945 by the decisional style of
48 (2d Cir. 1979); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.
1977), cerL. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
1975); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (Ist Cir.
1974), cerl. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Central Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970). See also In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [July-
Dec.] ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987, at F-1 (Oct. 30, 1980).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
219 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 147 (3d ed. 1981).
220 See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
221 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247
U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (Alcoa). 222 In Alcoa, the Second
Circuit, sitting by special Congressional authority,223 shifted the ana-
lytical framework towards a more structural economic analysis which
focused on Alcoa's market power.224 Judge Hand, writing for the
court, valued protection of small competitors over an efficiency-en-
hancing firm which held a large market share.225 This normative
approach was advanced by the court's refusal to weigh "the extent
and effect" of the firm's behavior "against its industrial or commer-
cial advantage. '226 The Court's analysis devalued economies
achieved through strategic planning such as capacity expansion to
encourage and meet demand. "[G]reat industrial consolidations
[were deemed] inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results. ' 227 The Court employed a straightforward analysis to draw
inferences regarding monopoly power from market share data. Size
alone "carried with it an opportunity for abuse, ' 228 and abuse could
be demonstrated by nonpredatory deliberate conduct. Conduct such
as excess productive capacity, though innocent standing alone, could
be considered abusive and exclusionary in light of the firm's market
power. The thin line between deliberateness of the conduct and the
defense of "superior skill, foresight and industry" became ambiguous
at best. The contrast to the earlier cases requiring conduct evidence
of predation to trigger a monopolization charge was striking.
The year following the Alcoa decision, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the Second Circuit's analytical approach. 229 Subsequent cases
reaffirmed Alcoa.230 Often the courts cast the deliberateness test in
terms of whether the challenged conduct evidenced harmfully re-
strictive or exclusionary features. The "exclusionary" test may have
served as an analytically distinctive middle ground between Standard
222 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See aiso United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323
U.S. 173 (1944).
223 322 U.S. 716 (1944); Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1903), amended by Act of June 9, 1944, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2109 (1980)).
224 Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
225 148 F.2d at 429. "[O]ne of. . .[the] purposes [of section two] was to perpetuate and
preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small
units ... " Id (emphasis added).
226 Id. at 428.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 430 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932)).
229 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
230 See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aJ'dpercuriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328 (1967), reu'd, 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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Oil's predation test and Alcoa's deliberateness standard, but even
these behavioral standards lacked dispositive clarity. The relation-
ships between conduct and dominant market position or power be-
came the determining analytic factor, and efficiency justifications
were not weighed. The greater the market power, the less behavioral
analysis was required. The Court analyzed a clear monopoly under
a stricter standard with a narrower range of decisional options than a
near-monopoly.31l
The Warren Court sanctioned Alcoa's populist hostility toward
firms having dominant market positions. In United States v. Grinnell
Cor. ,232 the Supreme Court's last major section two case, the Court
reaffirmed that a firm holding monopoly power cannot utilize its
power to advance or maintain its dominant market position. The
Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, expressly observed that
wilful use or maintenance of monopoly power was distinct from mar-
ket growth or development occasioned by benign factors such as
business acumen, product superiority, or historical accident.2 33 Im-
plicitly, Grinnell suggested that the monopolist was not confined to a
passive industrial role. "Business acumen" implied conscious strate-
gic decisionmaking. Clearly, conscious use of market power to en-
gage in exclusionary or competitively ruinous conduct, such as buy-
ing up competitors, met the standard of monopolization.2 34 Unclear
judicial guidelines left structural factors to resolve the distinctions be-
tween business acumen and a positive drive to maintain market
power. The Burger Court has refrained from entering the judicial
analysis in section two cases, an area which the Court must address in
the 1980's.
In the mid 1970's, the lower federal courts were confronted with
the analytical tension created between the divergent analyses in mo-
nopolization cases. The courts had not comfortably dealt with, and
indeed in many respects, as evidenced by Alcoa and its progeny, were
hostile to, strategic business planning as a procompetitive factor.
Courts had recognized efficiencies defenses in other areas of antitrust
jurisprudence, 23 5 but not in section two cases. The conduct stan-
dards recognized under section two seemed statically wedded to the
structuralist models of how industry and markets interact.23 6 The
231 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 165.
232 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
233 Id. at 570-71, 576-80.
234 Id at 576.
235 See text accompanying notes 92-96 supra.
236 See, e.g., J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959).
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prevailing preference in antitrust jurisprudence for absolute rules
over a balancing analysis added to the analytical narrowness.
Beginning with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp. ,237 the courts began to develop an analytical framework for ac-
commodating new issues concerning market strategies. Issues in-
cluded price and nonprice conduct which sought to optimize
strategic decisionmaking through market responses ranging from cost
efficiencies to predation. As industry reacted to changed competitive
conditions, the law also changed to relate to altered strategic conduct
and changed competitive values. The emerging decisional trend in-
dicates that courts should balance structural evidence, including
market share, concentration, and entry barrier data, with a greater
understanding and emphasis on the purpose and effect of the con-
duct involved in order to determine the competitive injury.
238
In the Telex litigation, the Tenth Circuit held that price cutting
by the dominant producer of ancillary computer units in order to
retain its market position against increased competition did not
amount to monopolization under section two. The court character-
ized the defendant's price cutting, which still yielded a 20 per cent
profit on the ancillary units, as a normal competitive response and
thus not predatory.239 The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in
Califomia Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp. ,240 where the court held
that price predation under section two did not include a monopolist's
lowering of prices which were still profitable in order to meet com-
petitors' prices. "[S]hrewdness in profitable price competition,"
241
even by a dominant firm, was encouraged, as it comes within Grin-
nell's business acumen standard.242 The courts in both cases rejected
237 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
238 See, e.g., Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th
Cir. 1980); California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979);
Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
239 See generally Areeda & Turner, Predato,7 Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975) (pricing above marginal cost or average variable
cost should be deemed lawful).
240 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 555 F.2d 1379
(9th Cir. 1978); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
241 613 F.2d at 742.
242 384 U.S. at 571. Contra United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
338-39 (1897). As Brown Shoe articulated earlier, the antitrust laws were enacted to promote
competition, not to insulate rival competitors from price competition.
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Alcoa's "deliberateness" test as a basis for supporting a monopoliza-
tion charge. Antitrust analysis returned to a more realist methodol-
ogy of balancing countervailing competitive factors as courts
weighed the competitive virtues of the conduct against anticompeti-
tive consequences.
In the celebrated case of Berkc Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ,243
the Second Circuit implicitly rejected its earlier opinion in Alcoa. In
attempting to define the standard of predation and exclusionary con-
duct under section two, Judge Kaufman, writing for the court, held
that "an action that gains a firm a competitive advantage is effective
because of the company's efficiency, prestige, and innovativeness,
and not because of its control over the market, . . . is not a use of
power.' 244 Berkey had challenged Kodak's practice of using its mar-
ket power in the film industry to promote its new instamatic camera.
Berkey argued that Kodak should have given its competitors
premarketing disclosure of the new camera and film to enable com-
petitors to compete at the time the new Kodak products were intro-
duced. Berkey urged that failure to predisclose constituted a
monopolization. The Second Circuit disagreed.
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit reasoned that
Kodak's simultaneous introduction of the new film format and the
new camera was due to efficiencies and integration rather than mar-
ket power in the film market. The court advanced a policy to en-
courage strategic business planning, even by a firm holding
monopoly power, which was not competitively unnatural and which
resulted in economies.
2 45
In rejecting the predisclosure requirement for product develop-
ment and innovation, the court observed that "even a monopolist
.. .has a right to the lead time that follows from its success" due to
economies. 246 The court based its reasoning on the premise that the
Sherman Act was designed to encourage aggressive competition on
the merits, even competition by a monopolist. 247 Without this pro-*
tection, competitive incentives would be lost.
243 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
244 Id. at 291 n.50.
245 While Berkf , reaffirmed GjftIth's proscription that a monopolist in one market cannot
use its market power in that market to achieve a competitive advantage in another, it found
insufficient evidence on this leverage theory to support the argument that Kodak used its
monopoly position in the film market to introduce the new camera format in the weaker
camera market. Id. at 282.
246 Id. at 283. The court also seemed concerned with the costs associated with establishing
"workable guidelines" for giving advance notice to competitors. Id. at 282.
247 Id. at 281.
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The Second Circuit and other circuits have embraced a compe-
tition efficiency analysis as the central antitrust objective. Courts
have largely abandoned Alcoa, and have devalued the deconcentra-
tion of monopoly power and the stabilization of small competitors as
antitrust goals. Economic models focusing on industry structure
have been replaced with economic models that attempt to predict
behavior based on allocative efficiency. Although the economically-
based jurisprudential approach adopted by the Burger Court in
other antitrust contexts, as evidenced in Broadcast Music and Sylvania,
seems to have influenced section two analysis, the Court itself has
refused to enter the debate.
The shift in monopolization analysis has not been lost on the
Federal Trade Commission. In In re E.L DuPont,2 48 the Commission
considered whether DuPont, which held a 42 percent share of the
titanium dioxide pigment market but which aggressively sought to
obtain a 65 percent share, had attempted to monopolize the market.
DuPont was charged under section five of the FTC Act with prema-
ture capacity expansion, exploitation of cost advantage by pricing
products high, and refusal to license its cost-saving technology to ri-
vals.249 After reviewing the decisional changes in the circuit law, the
Commission held that DuPont had not violated section five. The
Commission analyzed DuPont's strategic behavior under a broad
balancing analysis that weighed market structure, DuPont's position
within the market, the nature of the strategic conduct, alternative
conduct, and the competitive consequences of the market strategies.
The Commission deemed it essential to "weigh the relative competi-
tive virtues and evils of dominant firm behavior even in the monop-
oly context. '250 This "strategic" analysis extended beyond mere
acceptance of efficiency defenses. The Commission weighed cost su-
periority and economies against the exclusionary effects of the strate-
gic planning, and evaluated conduct not only with regard to its
efficiency-enhancing qualities but also with regard to "entry barriers
248 [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987, at F-1 (Oct. 30, 1980).
249 Id. See general'Y M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES (1981); Baumol, Quasi-Penna-
nence of Pn'ce Redutaio" A Polifor Prevention of Predatoy Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); Brodley
& Hay, Predator Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); Easterbrook, Predatog Strategies and Counter Strategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263 (1981); Joskow & Klevorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predato. ' Pricing Policy, 89
YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Salop, Strategic Enti Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 335 (1979); Scherer,
Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Spence, Entsy,
Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Aricing, 8 BELL J. OF ECON. 534 (1977); Williamson, Preda-
tog Pricing:" A Strategic and Wefare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
250 [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987, at F-7 (Oct. 30, 1980).
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and rival firm behavior."' 251 The Commission concluded that Du-
Pont's strategic conduct resulted from its "technological capacity and
market opportunities" 252 which were not designed to produce unnat-
ural entry barriers nor to unnecessarily exclude competition. 253 In
short, the Commission employed a multifaceted economic balancing
analysis that included both structural and actual competitive factors.
Analytical resolution required an evaluation of the challenged con-
duct's net competitiveness.
The development of the decisional law's analysis clearly indi-
cates the ascendancy of efficiency criteria as a valid defense under
section two. The precise weight to accord efficiency criteria in light
of other relevant market factors remains unclear, however. Berkey
and DuPont, while exceedingly helpful, do not fix the parameters of
the analysis. In attempting to foresee the Burger Court's approach to
section two, it is interesting to note that three members of the present
Court would have granted certiorari in the Berke case. Specifically,
Justices Powell and Rehnquist opined that a competition policy that
requires competitors to predisclose strategic marketing decisions to
other competitors is disquieting.254 Moreover, the dissenting justices
implied that the expansive language in Grinnell was intended to un-
dercut Grifith's rigid analysis. Grinnell's "business acumen" and "su-
perior product" references then may not be limited by the earlier
Alcoa, Brown Shoe and Griffith pronouncements. Recent developments
in the circuit courts call into question the continuing vitality of these
decisions.
IV. Towards a More Balanced Consensual Analysis
The Burger Court's antitrust decisions reflect many of the post-
realist criticisms dating from the 1950's. The Court has employed
antirealist notions that law should not be a means to achieve social
policy and that courts should not create new law to achieve desired
social results. The Court has, however, adopted in its decisional
methodology certain realist-like qualities such as the use of empirical
251 Id. at F-10 n.38.
252 Id. at F- 11.
253 Id. at F-10 (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345
(D. Mass. 1953)).
254 444 U.S. at 1094. Justice Rehnquist commented that the reason for these complex
antitrust cases is "either that the forest is being lost sight of because of the trees, or that an Act
of Congress has been battered, tortured, and encrusted with layer after layer of refinement
not required by any necessary construction of the Act, but by the results wrought by a cen-
tury of case-by-case adjudication of it in this court and other federal courts." Id. at 1095.
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and behavioral evidence. In seeking to bring objective benchmarks
to the analytic style, the Court has rejected a qualitative decision-
making approach and has accepted a juristic balancing analysis.
The narrow balancing analysis has been confined to an economic in-
quiry into whether the challenged conduct will enhance competition
through efficiency. The Court generally has rejected any open-ended
inquiry that includes socio-political considerations.
2 55
For the Court to say that it rejects a broader-based weighing
analysis because it is ill-equipped to weigh considerations other than
economic competitive factors is inconsistent with other decisional
trends that implicate antitrust policy. For instance, the Court re-
cently subordinated the importance of antitrust policy (and its com-
petitive efficiency goal) when it conflicted with admittedly
anticompetitive state statutes.2 56 In deciding these cases, the Court
implicitly balanced noneconomic interests in advancing its theme of
federalism. In each case, the Court decided that the state's right to
engage in economic regulation outweighed the regulation's anticom-
petitive consequences. Consistency, then, seems to be a selective
decisionmaking factor, dependent upon the normative objective be-
hind the analysis.
While the Court may state that its analysis must necessarily be
narrow so as not to engage in social legislation, the values inherent in
the Court's efficiency model clearly advance certain social, economic,
and political goals. The results are not value neutral. Economic effi-
ciency has replaced the Warren Court's competitive equality popu-
lism as the central goal of antitrust policy.2 5 7 The one-
dimensionalism of this analysis, however, excludes other relevant and
perhaps socially preferable considerations. Though the present court
255 Se, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144, 4151
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Sherman Act should not be deemed to
authorize federal courts to 'substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.'. . . The federal courts have not been ap-
pointed by the Sherman Act to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion.' "). Justice Rehnquist feared that such a decisional process would be "reminiscent of
[the] Lochner era" where the Court was charged with imposing social policy, without legisla-
tive directive, in the exercise of judicial review. Id
256 New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). But cf. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
257 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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does not apply as rigid a rule orientation as did the Warren Court,
use of this efficiency paradigm may nevertheless result in a mechani-
cal rather than functional jurisprudence. Other competitive factors
beyond efficiency have certainly found acceptance in the history of
antitrust analysis, as illustrated most recently in the FTC's DuPont
decision.
Analytical concerns addressed by the post-realists aid in under-
standing and evaluating the Burger Court's antitrust jurispru-
dence. 258  Key inquiries focus on whether the Burger Court's
antitrust decisions have been based on a "reasoned elaboration" of
the competing policies and values present in each case, whether the
opinions are internally consistent, and whether the Court's analytical
reasoning is based on a generally accepted consensus regarding the
ultimate values and policies involved.
Most observers would probably agree that the present Court has
generally set forth rather clearly its analytical process. Criticism
comes, however, when one considers that the Court prefers ad hoc
decisionmaking to establishing a coherent antitrust jurisprudence
that weighs fully the competing policies and values presented in each
case. The Court can be faulted, in addition, for failing to attempt to
reconcile conflicting decisions.
259
Wechsler's "consensual value" theory isolates the central weak-
ness of the Court's approach. The key issue under the "consensual
value" theory is whether widely held beliefs support the analytical
framework and the relevant values and interests. If the Court's eco-
nomic efficiency analysis does not enjoy wide support as the model
for interpreting antitrust policy, the post-realist would posit that the
result was not worthy of legitimacy.
The Burger Court has been influenced significantly by the cur-
rent literature advocating neoclassical economic price theory and sys-
258 As noted previously, the post-realists' model concerned constitutional interpretation.
Largely because of the open-endedness of the antitrust laws, courts have interpreted antitrust
legislation as a constitution-like "charter of economic liberty." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Consequently, the jurisprudential models of constitutional inter-
pretation serve as useful analytic measures in understanding antitrust decisionmaking. Al-
though it can be argued that the need for judicial restraint decreases when interpreting a
document which the legislature can change, congressional intervention or correction regard-
ing antitrust interpretation has been infrequent. Perhaps congressional inaction affirms that
the Court's approach is faithful to the legislative policy underlying the antitrust laws. Other
explanations are equally plausible.
259 Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), with Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); and compare




temic efficiency objectives.260  The Warren Court also used
economics as an analytical device, employing economic models that
focused exclusively on structure, power, and entry barriers. This
structural approach advanced aper se decisional orientation. In con-
trast, the Burger Court prefers economic models that attempt to ex-
plain and predict market behavior based on efficiency criteria, and
places less emphasis on per se rules.
The decisional approaches of both the Warren and Burger
Courts suffer from internal narrowness. Both rely on rigid, quantita-
tive factors to predict competitive behavior. Each Court has used
economics positively to establish a normative standard for setting an-
titrust policy, and each has interpreted the law according to its own
value orientation. One sanctioned an approach that sought to rec-
tify competitive inequality; the other fashioned an analysis that pro-
moted competitive efficiency.
Questions remain about which economic analysis will better
promote competition and how competition will be defined. Applica-
tion of Wechsler's "consensual value" theory reveals that no solid
consensus currently exists as to which economic theory can better in-
form and facilitate antitrust analysis and policy.26' Economic model-
ing is based, among other things, upon many assumptions concerning
behavior, and many of the assumptions draw on social and political
values and experience. Though cast in objective terms, the models
often used have a subjective context. Consequently, the positive use
of economics cannot be separated from socio-political considerations.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely quantify an economic
model that measures all of the relevant antitrust concerns. Many
analysts recognize a wide discrepancy between economic theory and
actual market conduct. 262 How, then, should the Court define and
shape antitrust analysis?
Antitrust policy has historically sought, at least in part, to pro-
tect the small, even less efficient competitor. Efficiencies analysis
now threatens to undermine that legacy. The nature of the judicial
inquiry will differ depending upon the normative approach em-
ployed. Antitrust analysis, like much of antitrust conduct, seems cyc-
260 e, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 139; Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Anal'ysir, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
261 Brodley & Hay, Predatogy Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution fLegal
Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981). See also In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
[July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987, at F-10 (Oct. 30, 1980).
262 S.C. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTERN & J.T. McCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTrrRuST LAws 263
(1981).
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lical. Yesterday the Warren Court advanced structuralism. Today
the Burger Court embraces efficiency. The uncertain ideologies of
each approach deny a clear consensus of opinion.
The cyclical history of antitrust analysis does not suggest, how-
ever, that a rational antitrust analysis will not evolve. Indeed, the
recent DuPont decision suggests a realist approach that weighs theo-
retical quantitative factors within a qualitative functional frame-
work. The strength of this approach lies in its inherent analytical
flexibility. The Commission in DuPont blended the structural and
efficiency analyses of the Warren and Burger Courts by utilizing a
balancing approach. The Commission evaluated market structure
and conduct, including entry-deterring conduct such as product in-
novation and capacity preemption, in light of cost economies. In de-
termining whether competition was exploited unreasonably, 263 the
Commission balanced anticompetitive consequences against efficien-
cies and abandoned per se rules. The analysis weighed the competi-
tive harms and benefits within their "market setting," including the
market's structure, the defendant's power, and the nature of the chal-
lenged conduct.
2M
[S]ome of the factors that appear especially pertinent to the ...
analysis include: 1) the extent to which the conduct enhances effi-
ciency or innovation, including profitability considerations; 2) the
extent to which the conduct is a reaction to competitive behavior,
demand shifts, new technology or other market conditions; 3) the
permanence or reversibility of the challenged actions; 4) the alter-
natives available to the firm and 5) the effect of the conduct on
entry barriers and rival firm behavior.
265
In sum, the Commission's analysis significantly redefines compe-
tition according to a more broadly based strategic planning model.
This "strategic approach" to decisionmaking, using the learning
from both structural and efficiency oriented theories, is only now
gaining recognition as an antitrust jurisprudential model. 266 The ap-
peal of this analytical approach lies in its rejection of a one-dimen-
sional antitrust analysis, favoring instead an open-ended inquiry that
considers market experience and conduct more relevant than theoret-
ical logic. The importance of this decisionmaking perspective tran-
263 In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 987, at F-I, F-6 (Oct. 30, 1980).
264 Id. at F-8 & F-10 n.38.
265 Id. at F-10 n.38.
266 See generaly S. SALOP, STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1981); cf.
Easterbrook, Prdatoe Strategies and Cotmlerstrategpk, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1981).
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scends all areas of antitrust analysis.267
To be sure, use of economics in the decisional process has helped
to make antitrust more economically rational. However, decisional
analysis should weigh market performance and efficiency against
market structure and practice. Efficiency should not be the single
measure of legality. Hopefully, as the courts continue to defirfe con-
sumer welfare and competition in the context of antitrust laws, they
will not reject the realist ideal that public policy decisionmaking
should include an appreciation of the historical, socio-political, and
economic background that has shaped the antitrust laws. Normative
judgments concerning what the law should be ought not exclude as
outdated the original understanding of the antitrust laws. Political
theory should not be replaced entirely with price theory. Almost one
hundred years of antitrust enforcement has demonstrated that expe-
rience rather than strict formalist logic best guides antitrust analysis.
Courts should apply a broadly focused industrial welfare analysis
and carefully weigh welfare tradeoffs according to relative impact in
each segment of the economy. In a pluralistic economy, interests and
values must continually be reevaluated and reconciled. Antitrust
law is no exception.
267 The strength of the analysis lies in its attempt to assimilate the structure and efficiency
schools of thought into a strategic planning approach. The analysis recognizes that struc-
turalists probably err in placing too little emphasis on technical efficiencies and that the effi-
ciency school ignores the dangers of market concentration. This approach allows not only the
efficiency defenses but also evidence of exclusionary effects of strategic planning. It places
faith in the court's ability to weigh the competing economic factors and make enlightened
decisions that determine the future economic structure. As increased emphasis is placed on
expert economic testimony in trying to ascertain the viability of potential competition, the
scale required for efficient competition, the concentration of the industry, and other matters
relevant to a full economic inquiry, the transaction costs of litigation will increase. If such a
thorough inquiry is required for a legitimized antitrust policy, then it cannot be considered a
waste ofjudicial resources.
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